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3I.  Introduction  
The question of race and its place in American life can appear in the most unpredictable and 
predictable places.  It was unpredictable that we would encounter both the ire and laughter raised in the 
midst of the Martin Luther King Day 2006 comments of New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin respecting the 
will of God in the creation and recreation of New Orleans, Louisiana as a Achocolate city@2 in the wake 
of what has been called the worst natural disaster in modern American history - Hurricane Katrina.3 It 
was unpredictable that we would witness the immediate post-Katrina pictures of the city of New 
Orleans across national and international news broadcasts, and that they would be peppered with 
scenes of the horror of those who did not immediately escape the wrath of the storm.  It is true that 
people from all stripes of life were devastated by the aftermath of the storm.  However, the face of the 
tragedy indelibly etched in the minds of millions was indeed a Louisiana brown, bittersweet chocolate 
picture.4 Yet, it was predictable that with the massive exodus of thousands from the city of New 
Orleans, most of whom were African American, questions of race, as they intersected the social, 
 
2Jarvis DeBerry, Mayor Steps in It, Totally Deep, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 20, 2006, at 7.  John Pope, Evoking 
King, Nagin Calls N.O. >Chocolate= City: Speech Addresses Fear of Losing Black Culture, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 17, 
2006, at 1. The King Day Celebration on Monday, January 16, 2006 will long be remembered for Mayor Ray Nagin=s
prediction that a fully restored New Orleans Awill be chocolate at the end of the day.@ The context of the Achocolate@ he 
refers to originates from a 1975 album title AChocolate City@ produced by George Clinton for the funk group Parliament. 
The lyrics of the song AChocolate City@ were written by George Clinton:  AThere=s a lot of chocolate cities around. We got 
Newark, we got Gary. Someone told me we got L.A. But you=re the capital C.C.@ Parliament, Chocolate City, G. Clinton, 
W. Collins, B. Worrell, Casablanca Records (1975). The song is about Washington, D.C., where African Americans 
comprise a majority of the population. However, Clinton=s lyrics suggest that the existence of Achocolate cities@ in general 
 may be a deserved piece Aof the rock@ for African Americans because they are proxies for the promised A40 acres and a 
mule@ that failed to materialize as post-Civil War reparations for slavery. Id. 
3 See Felicia R. Lee, After the Flood, the Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at E1 (commenting on Spike Lee=s
portrayal of despair Hurricane Katrina left upon New Orleans); see also Gary Rivlin, Some People Return, but Only One 
in 10 Businesses Has Reopened, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at C1 (discussing difficulties small businesses face in wake of 
Katrina). 
4 See Leslie Eaton, Hurricane Aid Finally Flowing to Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at A1 (distinguishing 
hardships Louisiana must endure in drawing back its residents from the lesser troubles affecting Mississippi). 
4political, economic, and educational future of the city, would arise.5
Looming in the wake Hurricane Katrina=s wrath was the expiration of the Settlement 
Agreement in United States v. Louisiana,6 the state=s higher education desegregation lawsuit.  
Concomitantly, in the state of Mississippi, it had not been quite a year since the United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in Ayers v. Thompson.7 The expiration of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement 
slipped by quietly and was lost in the vortex of the state=s tornadic financial crisis caused by Katrina.  
The impact of expiration of the Settlement Agreement and the pending dismissal of United States v. 
Louisiana from federal court oversight raises questions respecting the future flavor of higher education 
in the state, but not so brazenly as the Mayor=s bizarre comments.  Although the questions come sub 
voce, they are present and not unpredictable.  This Article seeks to raise some of the predictable 
questions in the Louisiana case, as well as some from the Mississippi case. 
The Article will expose the perfect constitutional storm created by the higher educational 
systems in the nineteen states with prior de jure systems of segregation in higher education.  It 
chronicles the struggles of two states, Mississippi and Louisiana, post-Brown v. Board of Education, as 
they have struggled to reach constitutionally mandated equality of educational services in their 
respective higher education systems.  The Article will specifically compare the histories of the higher 
education desegregation lawsuits in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana as they traversed decades 
 
5 See Michelle R. Smith, Study: New Orleans Could Lose 80 Percent of Black Population, BOSTON.COM, Jan. 26, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode_island/articles/2006/01/26/study_new_orleans_could_lose_80_percent_of_black
_population (discussing Hurricane Katrina=s disproportionate effect on African Americans). 
6 9 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1993). 
7 See 543 U.S. 951 (2004). At the Supreme Court level the case was entitled United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 
(1992). The Mississippi higher education case had a long life through a succession of Governors, hence the changes in 
party name reflect this succession: Governors William Allain (1984-1988); Ray Mabus (1988-1992); Daniel Kirkwood 
5of litigation, and it will compare these states= experiences and  progress under settlement agreements.  
The State of Mississippi has been released from federal court oversight and by the time this Article has 
been published, it may be as well that the State of Louisiana will have been released from federal court 
oversight.  The populations of the many universities in both states are still largely identifiable as 
Achocolate@ or Avanilla@ and so the Article will pose a question not only respecting the implementation 
of United States v. Fordice in both states, but also respecting the value of the Aintegrative ideal@which 
sought to convert Achocolate schools@ and Avanilla schools@ to Ajust schools.@8
II.  The Creation of the Perfect Constitutional Storm: Nineteen States With De Jure 
Segregation in Education 
 
The idea of a free and public school education was a new concept for the states of the union 
during the first half of the nineteenth century.9 Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, it was largely a 
given that if states chose to provide any education for African Americans, it would be provided in 
separate facilities.10 The immediate post-Civil War period witnessed the growth and availability of 
 
(Kirk) Fordice (1992-2000); Ronnie Musgrove (2000-2004); Haley Barbour (2004-present). 2004-2008 Miss. Reg. 67.  
8 Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (paraphrasing Justice Brennan=s instructions to New 
Kent County School Board to construct a desegregation plan that would Aconvert promptly to a system without a >white=
school and a >Negro= school, but just schools.@). 
9 See JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935 2 (UNC Press 1988) (noting that it was 
not until nineteenth century's end that Aorganization, scope, and role of schooling were transformed into a carefully 
articulated structure of free tax-supported public institutions@); see also HARRY GEHMAN GOOD & JAMES D. TELLER, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 132B35 (1973) (discussing Anew principle@ of Afree education for all in public, common 
schools@); LEON LITWACK, Education: Separate and Unequal, EDUCATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY, READINGS ON THE 
SOCIAL ISSUES 253 (Michael B. Katz ed., Praeger 1973) (highlighting North=s outraged reaction, and subsequent protesting, 
to notion of equal opportunity for all students in early nineteenth century). 
10 LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO AND THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 113 (University of Chicago Press 
1961) (suggesting that whether or not African Americans should be educated, quality and nature of their education, as well 
as where they should be educated were issues that had to be resolved simultaneously; however, separation in educational 
facilities was of immediate importance: Apossibility that Negro children would be mixed with white children in the same 
classroom aroused even greater fears and prejudices than those that consigned the Negro to an inferior place in the church, 
the theater, and the railroad cars. This indeed constituted virtual amalgamation.@). 
6public schools, largely to the exclusion of African American children.11 Education was a local matter 
and within the purview of state authority.12 However, once, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by 
the states, it became a proxy for the threat of interference in all state prerogatives which had previously 
supported regimes of separateness.  In response to the threat, states enacted positive law on the topic.13 
Moreover, to those which were part of the Confederate movement for secession, the Fourteenth 
Amendment now represented both the stick and the carrot.  It was carrot-like in that it represented an 
opportunity to rejoin the nation on equal footing. It was stick-like also, in that the state=s representation 
in Congress would only be recognized once the state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.14 
And yet, there came a richer and more systemized set of Black Codes and Jim Crow laws 
which would be fortified by the United States Supreme Court=s introduction of the new Aequality@
11 ANDERSON, supra note_9, at 2. 
12 ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 2. 
13 See Report of the Senate Committee on Federal Relations, 1866 TEX. S.J. 421 (noting that after state of Texas legislature 
voted to reject ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, Senate Committee on Federal Relations reported: 
 
[T]he adoption of the [Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth] amendments] to the Constitution of the 
United States are unnecessary and dangerous to the future peace of the Republic; because they are 
founded and proceed upon the assumption of two propositions, both of which are believed to be false; 
because these amendment alter the form and fashion of our Government, because they centralize 
power in the Federal Congress, making the States mere appendages to a vast oligarchy, at the National 
Capitol;... and at the same time, and by the act, placing it in the power of Congress to clothe the negro 
with the election franchise@
Id.; see also WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM=S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
CONTROL 1861-1915 216B217 (1991) (discussing laws passed by various states, including Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida, regarding miscegenation, school segregation, transportation, and public 
accommodations). 
14 See 14 Stat. 153 (1867), 15 Stat. 6 (1867), 15 Stat. 30 (1867) (discussing Reconstruction Acts of 1867 which declared 
state constitutions of former secessionist states to be in violation of United States Constitution; separated them into districts 
governed under military authority and martial law; required them to conduct new constitutional conventions which 
protected rights of African Americans to vote; required  rebel states to ratify Fourteenth Amendment in order to be 
readmitted to Union). 
7which was to dominate the twentieth century.15 A constitutionalized regime of separateness was now 
sanctioned under Plessy v. Ferguson.16 As part of this regime,  the schoolhouse became the situs of  
more regimented laws governing the separation of the races.17 Nineteen states of this country share this 
common history respecting the provision of educational services to their citizenries.  They each share a 
legacy of de jure segregation in education.  State constitutional and statutory provisions required the 
separation in education based on race, in elementary and secondary education, as well as in higher 
education.  
 Everyone knows of the southern states= histories respecting the issue.  Of the southern states, 
Alabama,18 Arkansas,19 Florida,20 Georgia,21 Louisiana,22 Mississippi,23 North Carolina,24 Oklahoma,25 
15 See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22B29 (Oxford University Press 1974). 
16 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
17 WOODWARD, supra note 15, at 24 (describing public schools as Amost conspicuous@ aspect of segregation). 
18 See 1831 Ala. Acts Section 10,  p. 16. Teaching African Americans was a crime in the State of Alabama:  
 
[A]ny person . . . who shall endeavor or attempt to teach any free person of color, or slave, to spell, read, 
or write, shall, upon conviction thereof . . . be fined . . . not less than two hundred and fifty dollars nor 
more than five hundred dollars. 
 
The state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment under a military district legislature in 1868. In August of 1868, the Alabama 
legislature=s public school enactment required that "in no case shall it be lawful to unite in one school both colored and white 
children, unless it be by the unanimous consent of the parents and guardians of such children; but said trustees shall in all 
other cases provide separate schools for both white and colored children. 1868 Ala. Acts 148. The requirement of separation 
in education based on race was enshrined in the Alabama state constitution in 1875: AThe General Assembly shall establish . 
. . a system of public schools . . . but separate schools shall be provided for the children of citizens of African descent.@ALA.
CONST. of 1875, art. XIII, ' 1. The subsequent Constitution of 1901 maintained the separation under different language: 
ASeparate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend 
the school of the other race.@ ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. XIV, ' 256. This section was invalidated by Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 
19 The Arkansas legislature first provided for separate educations for African Americans and whites in 1867 after it voted not 
to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute provided that: A[N]o negro or mulatto shall be admitted to attend any public 
school in [the] state, except such schools as may be established exclusively for colored persons.@ 1866-67 ARK. ACTS, No. 
25, Section 5, p. 100. The state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 after it was established as a military district under 
the First Reconstruction Act. In the same year, the Arkansas Constitution of 1868 provided for the establishment of a system 
of free public education without a requirement of racial separation. ARK. CONST. OF 1868, art. IX, ' 1 (invalidated by Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Pursuant to this constitutional mandate the Arkansas state legislature enacted a statute 
requiring Athe establish[ment of] separate schools for white and colored children and youths.@ ARK. CONST. OF 1868, art. IX, 
8' 1. 
20 FLA.STAT. VOL. 11, TITLE  25 ' 228.09 (repealed 1965) provided: 
 
The schools for white children and the schools for negro children shall be conducted separately. No 
individual, body of individuals, corporation, or association shall conduct within this state any school of 
any grade (public, private, or parochial) wherein white persons and negroes are instructed or boarded in 
the same building or taught in the same classes or at the same time by the same teachers. 
F. S.A. Vol. 11, Title XV, Section  239.01 of 1963,  created the system of higher education in Florida admitting 
white males and white females to the University of Florida in Gainesville, and  Florida State University in 
Tallahassee and Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University in Tallahassee to which Black males and females 
were admitted.   
21Subsequent to Georgia=s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment on February 2, 1870,  the state=s statutory law required 
separation in public education based on race.   The law  required that: Athe children of the white and colored races shall not 
be taught together in any sub-district of the State.@ An Act to Establish a System of Public Instruction, October 13, 1870, 
Public Laws, 1870, p. 49, at p. 57. 
22The Louisiana Constitution of 1852 provided the public funds for education be given to A...each parish in proportion to the 
number of free white children between such [school] ages.@ LA. CONST. of 1852, Title VIII, art. 136. The Constitution was 
amended in 1868 in response to the Fourteenth Amendment to state: 
 
The General Assembly shall establish at least one free public school in every parish throughout the State, 
... All children of this State, . . . shall be admitted . . . in common without distinction of race, color, or 
previous condition. There shall be no separate schools or institutions of learning established exclusively 
for any race by the State of Louisiana. 
 
LA. CONST. of 1868, art. 135. The Louisiana Constitution was amended in 1879 to remove the race neutral admissions 
provisions and instead provided that there would be schools Afor the education of all children in the state....@ LA. CONST. of 
1879, art. 224. This same Constitution provided for the Aestablish[ment] in the city of New Orleans a university for the 
education of persons of color . . . " LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 231. The Constitution was revised again in 1898 after Plessy v. 
Ferguson and provided: "There shall be free public schools for the white and colored races, separately established by the 
General Assembly throughout the State, for the education of all the children of the State." LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 248. 
23 Mississippi=s first legislation creating free public education was passed in 1870: 
 
[A]ll the children of this State between the ages of five and twenty-one years, shall have, in all respects, equal 
advantages in the Public Schools.  And it shall be the duty of the School Directors of any District to establish an 
additional School in any Sub-District thereof, whenever the parents or guardians of twenty-five children of legal 
school age, and who reside within the limits of such Sub-District, shall make a written application to said Board for 
the establishment of the same. 
 
1870 Miss. Laws. Lieutenant Governor Ridgley Powers confirmed that the legislation approved of separate education based 
on race when he declared, "If the people desire to provide separate schools for white and black, or for good and bad children, 
there is nothing in this laws that prohibits it." 1879 Miss. Laws. The Mississippi statutory law of 1878 was amended to 
specifically provide: "schools in each county shall be so arranged as to afford ample free school facilities to all the educable 
youths in that county, but white and colored pupils shall not be taught in the same schoolhouse, but in separate school-
houses." 1878 Miss. Laws 103. Still later the state constitution provided that A[s]eparate schools shall be maintained for 
children of the white and colored races.@ MISS. CONST. of 1892, art. VIII, ' 207. 
24The North Carolina State Constitution of 1868 was amended to provide for separate education for African Americans after 
the state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.  It stated:  "children of the white race and the children of the colored race shall 
9South Carolina,26 Tennessee,27 Texas,28 and Virginia29 have histories of segregation in education.  
 
be taught in separate public schools; but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice of either race." 
Article IX, Section 2.   See STATES= LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 329 ( Pauli Murray ed. 1997).  The statutory 
provision establishing public schools required that: Aschool authorities of each and every Township . . . establish a separate 
school or separate schools for the instruction of children and youth of each race . . . @ 1868-1869 N.C. Sess. Laws 184. 
25 OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. XIII, ' 3. This section provided:  A[s]eparate schools for white and colored children with like 
accommodation shall be provided by the Legislature and impartially maintained.@ Id. 
26 Although the South Carolina Constitution of 1868 stated that public schools were to be Aopen to all the children and youths 
of the State, without regard to race or color,@ the actual practice throughout the state was separation in schools based on race. 
 A later constitution of 1895 created a system of free public education based on race:   ASeparate schools shall be provided 
for children of the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall ever be permitted to attend a school provided for 
children of the other race.   South Carolina State Constitution of 1895, Article XI, Section 7.  
27 See 1866-67 Tenn. Pub. Acts  39. Tennessee ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and at the same time passed an 
amendment to the state law providing for public schools: 
 
[T]he Civil District Board of Education, in their respective Districts, and the several other Boards of Education and 
Directors or other officers . . . shall be, and they are hereby, authorized and required to establish within their 
respective jurisdictions, one or more special schools for colored children, when the whole number by enumeration 
exceeds twenty-five, so as to afford them, as far as practicable, the advantages of a common school education . . . 
but in case the average number of colored children in attendance, shall be less than fifteen for any one month, it 
shall be the duty of said Board of Education . . . to discontinue said school or schools for any period not exceeding 
five months at any one time. Id. 
Additional and subsequent statutory law provided for free public education :  "white and colored persons shall not be taught 
in the same school but in separate schools under the same general regulations as to management, usefulness and efficiency." 
1873 Tenn. Stat. 46. Tennessee statutory law was codified in 1873 and the codal provisions for education provided : AThe 
schools for white children, and for colored children, shall be kept separate and apart from each other, and the School 
Commissioners for each  District shall strictly observe this requirement@. Tennessee Code of 1873, Section 1001a.  
Tennessee state constitutional law provided for public education beginning in 1834, creating a Acommon school fund@ for 
children of the state.   Tennessee Constitution of 1834, Article XI, Section 10.  In 1870, the state constitution was amended 
to provide:   ANo school established or aided under this Section shall allow white and negro children to be received as 
scholars together in the same school.@ Tennessee Constitution of 1834, Article XI, Section 12.   
28 See TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. VII ' 7. Prior to its ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state provided separate 
education for African Americans through state constitutional authority: 
 
The Legislature may provide for the levying of a tax for educational purposes; provided, the taxes levied 
shall be distributed from year to year . . .; and provided, that all the sums arising from said tax which may 
be collected from Africans, or persons of African descent, shall be exclusively appropriated for the 
maintenance of a system of public schools for Africans and their children . . . . 
 
Id. Texas ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, March 30, 1870. Subsequent constitutional provisions established free public 
school education and separate but equal education for white and African Americans. See TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, ' 4. 
This section required the establishment of a Auniform system of public free schools throughout the State.@ Id. See also TEX. 
CONST. of 1876, art. VII, ' 7. This section required: ASeparate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, 
and impartial provision shall be made for both.@ Id. 
29 The state of Virginia ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in its 1869-1870 session of the legislature. In this same legislative 
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Maryland30 and Pennsylvania,31 both mid-Atlantic states, also maintained de jure segregation in 
education.  Four border states: Missouri,32 West Virginia,33 Delaware34 and Kentucky35 also required 
 
session, the state permitted separating races in schools, as it read, Awhite and colored persons shall not be taught in the same 
school, but in separate schools.@ 1869-70 Va. Acts 259, Section 47. The state provided for public education in the 1867 
constitution. See 1867 Va. Acts art. VIII, Section 3. It was not until 1902 that the constitutional provision required separation 
by race. See also VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I ' 140. 
30 See MD. CONST. 1867, art. VIII section 1.  Maryland State Constitution of 1867 authorized the establishment of public 
school education. Pursuant to this constitutional authority the Maryland state legislature provided appropriations for public 
schools in 1868 for white children between six and eighteen years old. 1868 Md. Laws 8, Section 1. The statute allowed tax 
money paid for schools by African Americans to be Aset aside for the maintaining the schools for colored children . . . .@ 1868 
Md. Laws 9, Section 1.
31 Prior to Pennsylvania=s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867, the state required separate education based on 
race by mandating Adirectors or controllers of the several districts of the State, are hereby authorized and required to 
establish, within their respective districts, separate schools for the tuition of Negro and mulatto children . . . .@ 1854 Pa. Laws 
623. The state did not repeal this law until 1881. See PA. STAT.' 535 (1700-1897). 
32 At one time Missouri criminalized teaching African Americans: ANo person shall keep or teach any school for the 
instruction of Negroes or mulattoes, in reading or writing in this state.@ MO. REV. STAT. 1100 (1856). Once this statutory bar 
was lifted, Missouri constitutions of 1865 and 1875 required separate schools for children of African descent. See MO.
CONST. of 1865, art. IX ' 2. This provision stated "[s]eparate schools may be established for children of African descent.@ Id. 
MO. CONST. of 1868, art. XI ' 3. Additionally, the state had a long succession of statutory provisions requiring separate 
education for African American children. See 1889 Mo. Laws 226; 1887 Mo. Laws 264; MO. REV. STAT. ' 7052 (1879); 
1874 Mo. Laws 163B164; 1869 Mo. Laws 86; 1868 Mo. Laws 170; 1865 Mo. Laws 177. 
33 West Virginia=s state constitution of 1863 ensured free public education reading, Alegislature shall provide, as soon as 
practicable, for the establishment of a thorough and efficient system of free schools.@ W. VA. CONST. art. X ' 2. Pursuant to 
this constitutional authority the state legislature created a free public school system with the following provisos: 
 
The township Board of Education are hereby, authorized and required to establish . . . one or more 
separate schools for free colored children when the whole number by enumeration exceeds 30, so as to 
afford them, as far as practicable under the circumstances, the advantages and privileges of a free school 
education . . . but in case the average attendance of free colored children shall be less than 15 for any 
one month, it shall be the duty of the Board . . . to discontinue said school . . . for a period not exceeding 
six months . . . . 
 
W. Va. Acts 250. The state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on January 16, 1867 and the ratifying legislature enacted 
statutory law on February 27, 1867 which provided that A[w]hite and colored persons shall not be taught in the same school . 
. . .@ 1867 W. Va. Acts 117. The same text was incorporated in the new West Virginia state constitution of 1872. W. VA.
CONST. of 1872, art. VII ' 8. The Martin court held that this state constitutional provision does not conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Martin v. Bd. of Educ., 26 S. E. 348, 349 (1896). 
34 See DEL. CONST. of 1897, Art. X, Sect. 2. Free public school education was established and maintained under the 
Delaware State Constitution of 1897 through deceptively neutral language: 
 
[N]o distinction shall be made on account of race or color, and separate schools for white and colored 
children shall be maintained.  STATES= LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 71 (Pauli Murray ed. ) citing 
Delaware State Constitution of 1897, Art. X, Sect. 2. 
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that blacks and whites be educated separately.  Finally, Ohio36 is the only Midwestern state with this 
history.  With the Supreme Court=s imprimatur of separate as the constitutional measure of equality in 
Plessy v. Ferguson,37 a firm constitutional basis for the development and maintenance of inferior 
school services for African Americans was inevitable.38 This constitutional doctrine was not reversed 
 
35 KY. CONST. of 1891, ' 187 (requiring equal distribution of school fund and separate schools for African Americans and 
Caucasians). 
36 A succession of Ohio statutory laws required separate schools based on race. See 1847 Ohio Laws 81, 1848 Ohio Laws 17, 
1874 Ohio Laws 81. 
37 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896). 
38 Although Plessy does not use the term explicitly, the case is often cited as announcing the Aseparate but equal@ doctrine. It 
would not present any problem under the Fourteenth Amendment for states to require that blacks and whites attend separate 
universities as long as the educational services were Asubstantially equal.@ The Asubstantially equal@ part of Plessy separation 
was never actualized. Plessy-age historically black colleges and universities suffered from a host of problems related to 
chronic disparities in funding and states were willing to adopt extraordinary measures to maintain separation. For example, 
some states willingly provided tuition grants to blacks to attend college in states where there were no legal barriers to 
integrated higher education. The plaintiff in Pearson v. Murray wanted to attend law school at the University of Maryland, 
his home state, but the state law would not allow it. 169 Md. 478, 485 (C.A. Md. 1936). Instead, the state would have been 
willing to send him to Howard University in Washington, D. C.  Id. at 485. The plaintiff in Gaines v. Canada, wanted to 
attend law school at the University of Missouri, however, a state statute authorized the Board of Curators of Lincoln 
University to pay black Missourians= fee for attendance at the law school in an adjacent state. 342 Mo. 121,130 (S.C. Miss. 
1938). Ada Lois Sipuel, a resident of the State of Oklahoma, wanted to attend law school at the University of Oklahoma, but 
the Oklahoma statutory law would not allow it.  Instead, Oklahoma would instead pay for her to go to law school outside the 
state. The United States Supreme Court ordered Ms. Sipuel to be provided with an equal legal education and remanded the 
case to the trial court stating that there were two choices: admit her to the University of Oklahoma Law School or 
immediately establish a black law school. Sipuel at 632-633.  Rather than admit Miss Sipuel to the University of Oklahoma 
School of Law, the state quickly ordered the establishment of a separate law school for African Americans. See RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, 259-260 (1975). The Supreme Court denied Sipuel=s writ of mandamus seeking to compel 
the state=s compliance with its order.  Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948).  Sipuel was subsequently admitted to the 
University of Oklahoma School of Law and graduated  in 1951. ADA SIPUEL & DANNEY GOBLE, A MATTER OF 
BLACK AND WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADA LOIS SIPUEL FISHER___ (1996).   In Sweatt v. Painter,
Hemann Marion Sweatt was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School under a state law that required racial 
separation in schools.  The Supreme Court found that the separate school for African Americans was not substantially equal 
to the University of Texas School of Law and Sweatt was ordered admitted.  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629  at 634-636 
(1950).  G. W. McLaurin sought admission to the graduate school at the University of Oklahoma and was met with the 
application of the same state law as Sipuel.  After the Gaines decision, the Oklahoma legislature amended its statutory law to 
allow the admission of African Americans to historically white schools when there were no separate historically black 
schools.  Upon his admission, McLaurin was required to sit in a separate classroom,  use a separate desk in the library; and 
eat at a separate time in the cafeteria.  The Supreme Court found these practices  violative of  the Equal Protection Clause.  
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637, 640-642 (1950).  The law of  Plessy, however,  was not destroyed by any of these 
this rulings. 
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until the Court=s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.39 Now, another fifty-one years after Brown 
v. Board of Education, the United States Department of Education=s Office of Civil Rights is still 
involved in the oversight of desegregation efforts in Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, Ohio, and Virginia.40 Additionally, three states= court ordered higher education decrees have 
recently expired.  The Alabama Settlement Agreement expired on July 31, 2005.41 The Louisiana 
Settlement Agreement expired on December 31, 2005.42 Tennessee=s Consent Decree expired on 
January 4, 2006.43 The state of Mississippi recently entered a Settlement Agreement on March 29, 
2001.44 It is notable that over one hundred years after Plessy v. Ferguson, the beginning of the 21st 
century has witnessed four states in ongoing federal court desegregation litigation, and seven others in 
desegregation partnership agreements, struggling with the seemingly intractable problem of race and 
equality of educational opportunity.45 
III. Delay and Deliberation: The Problem of Resistance Creates Decades of 
Constitutional Crisis  
 
Brown v. Board of Education carried the promise and opportunity for the improvement of the 
status of the historically black college. Although the Court held that separate educational systems 
 
39 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  Brown involved the consolidation of four desegregation cases from Kansas, South Carolina, 
Delaware and Virginia. The United States Supreme Court determined that if states chose to provide elementary and 
secondary public school education to its citizens, the states were required to do so equally without regard to race. The 
provision of educational services in a racially segregated environment was Ainherently unequal.@ Id. at 495. 
40 See note 70 infra.   
41United States v. Alabama, 900  F. Supp. 272 (N. D. Ala. 1995). 
42 Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United 
States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at I (Oct. 2005). 
43 Consent Decree, Geier v. Sundquist, E. Miscellaneous, I. Court Jurisdiction and Term of Agreement, No. 5077, at 26, 51 
(Jan. 4, 2000) (stating, "Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case for a period of five years or for a period of time sufficient 
to insure compliance with the Agreement's terms."). 
44 Final Judgment, Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, at 1 (Feb. 15, 2002) (joining in approval of Settlement 
Agreement dated March 29, 2001). 
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based on race were unconstitutional respecting segregated elementary and secondary schools, the case 
was immediately thought to apply in the higher education context.46 When the Brown v. Board of 
Education II court gave the time line for implementation of Aall deliberate speed,@ the message heard 
by the states was delay, thus setting in motion part of the reason for fifty years of constitutional crisis 
in converting dual educational systems into unitary educational systems.    
After it was clear that state laws could no longer require exclusion of African Americans from 
white institutions of higher learning, some states employed clever but surreptitious methods seeking to 
block the admission of black students.  In this first wave of post Brown I  higher education equal 
opportunity cases, states employed a variety of measures intended to thwart African American students' 
entry into its previously segregated universities.  For example, Louisiana statutory law required 
Arnease Ludley to obtain a certificate of good character from her high school principal for admission 
to Louisiana State University.47 However, she was unable to obtain the certificate because the same 
statute required the principal=s dismissal for providing the certificate.48 Autherine Lucy and Polly Ann 
Myers were summoned to the offices of the Dean of Admissions at the University of Alabama where 
 
45 See note 70 infra and accompanying text. 
46 After the Court decided Brown on  May 17, 1954, State of Florida ex rel. Virgil  D. Hawkins came before the court on May 
24, 1954. See State of Florida ex. rel Virgil D. Hawkins 347 U. S.  971 (1954). Hawkins was denied admission the 
University of Florida School of Law. The Court  remanded the case to the state of Florida for consideration  in light of the 
Court=s decision in  Brown I. Upon remand, the state of Florida determined that it would have consider whether changes were 
necessary at the university level in order to accommodate an African American student, citing Brown II=s imprecise time line 
for the implementation of desegregation respecting Hawkins= case. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.  294 (1955). 
 See State ex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 83 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1955). Subsequently, the Court recalled, vacated 
this order and entered a new order relying on  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, (1950); Sipuel v Board of Regents of Univ. of 
Ok., 332 U.S. 631 (1947); and  McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Hawkins was 
Aentitled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates.@State of Florida ex rel. 
Virgil D. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956). 
47 See Ludley v. Bd. of Supervisors of L. S. U., 150 F. Supp. 900, 901 (E.D. La. 1957). 
48 See id. at 903 (noting statutes were unconstitutional because intent behind their creation was to discriminate and circumvent 
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their applications for admission were personally returned to them.49 They were told that the course 
work that interested them could be found at Alabama State College, the historically black institution.50 
Myra Dinsmore=s application for admission to the Georgia State College of Business Administration 
was returned incomplete because she did  not attached the required certificates of good character 
furnished by alumni of the institution.51 James Meredith=s application to the University of Mississippi 
was also judged defective because he did not furnish recommendations from alumni attesting to the 
fitness of his moral character.52 Additionally, the registrar of the University expressed concerns that 
Mr. Meredith Awas not seeking admission to the University of Mississippi in good faith for the purpose 
of securing an education,@ and that AMeredith=s fear that his application might be denied because of his 
race >shocked, surprised and disappointed=" the Registrar.53 His request for admission was so Arash@ and 
Aunjustified@ that it raised grave questions as to Meredith=s Aability to conduct himself as a normal 
person@ and Aas a harmonious student on the campus of the University of Mississippi.@54 The Fifth 
Circuit=s remand, ordering Meredith=s injunctive relief and its determination that Meredith was 
excluded Asolely because he was a Negro,@ was a signal that the demand of Brown I was real and could 
not be countermanded by AFabian polic[ies] of worrying the enemy into defeat while time worked for 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). 
49 See Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 237 (N.D. Ala. 1955). 
50 See id. at 239. The federal court enjoined the Dean of Admissions from denying Lucy, Myers and all others similarly 
situated, from enrolling in the University of Alabama based on race. Id. 
51 See Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959). All alumni of the institution prior to the applications of the 
plaintiffs were white and therefore the applications would not have been forthcoming. The federal court enjoined the 
defendants= actions requiring certification that only white alumni could give. Id. at 857. 
52 Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1962). 
53 Id. at 350. 
54 Id. 
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the defenders.@55 The ebb of the first wave of post Brown I  higher education equal opportunity cases 
was now ushering in the second - the higher education desegregation lawsuits.  
The higher education desegregation lawsuits have been fought on two federal fronts.  Plaintiffs 
sought to compel HEW to enforce the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on one 
federal court front and private plaintiffs and the United States Department of Justice filed suits seeking 
to dismantle prior systems of segregated higher education on another. Respecting the first front, 
Adams v. Richardson56 succeeded informal attempts of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (AHEW@) to work with state governments to desegregate their prior de jure systems of higher 
education.57 In January of 1969, the HEW  made a finding of fact that ten states were operating dual 
systems of education based on race.58 Subsequently, HEW sent correspondence to the governors of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 
Maryland and Virginia informing them that their states were out of compliance with Title VI and in 
danger of losing vital federal funds because they maintained dual systems of education.59 Each state 
 
55Id at 361.  Amidst 400 United States deputy marshals and 1,000 federal troops, James Meredith finally enrolled at 
University of Mississippi on October 1, 1962.  See, Al Kuettner, Ole Miss Enrolls Meredith After Riots Kill 2, Injure 
75, United Press International, Oct. 1, 1962.  Judge John Minor Wisdom wrote the opinion in Meredith v. Fair.  His 
characterization of Mississippi=s delay tactics referenced the military strategy of the Roman General, Fabius, who was 
known for Ake[eping] his army always near Hannibal=s but never attack[ing], harassing Hannibal continually, but never 
joining battle.@ The New Columbia Encyclopedia  916 (William H. Harris & Judith S. Levey eds.,Columbia U. Press  
1974). 
56 Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D. D.C. 1972). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: ANo person in 
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national original, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.@ Id. Each 
agency has been given the power by Congress to make rules to accomplish the statutory goal of non-discrimination. Each 
agency is also given the power to seek compliance with Title VI by refusing to advance further federal funding after notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. See generally 42 U.S.C. ' 2000d. This statute seeks to foster voluntary compliance ahead of 
coercive action. Pursuant to the statute, Congress must be notified prior to the time an agency seeks to withhold funding. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 637B38. 
59 See id. at 638. 
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was invited to submit a desegregation plan within 120 days.  Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 
Maryland, and Virginia submitted plans that HEW determined to be inadequate for dismantling the de 
jure systems of segregation in the states.  Florida, North Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana and 
Oklahoma never submitted plans.60 HEW did not aggressively seek enforcement of Title VI after the 
determinations of non-compliance were made.61 Because of HEW=s lack of diligence in enforcing the 
requirements of Title VI, Kenneth Adams and other named plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare and the Director of the Office of Civil Rights, seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief to mandate the agency to perform its statutory duty.62 The district granted the relief 
sought by plaintiffs.  Judge John Pratt found that once a recipient of federal educational funds was 
found in violation of Title VI=s non-discrimination requirements and has failed to voluntarily correct 
non-compliance, the Office of Civil Rights had no discretion to allow a recipient to continue receiving 
further federal funding.63 Additionally, Judge Pratt determined that HEW was statutorily bound to 
enforce the requirements of Title VI.64 The Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
affirmed the district court=s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but determined that the states 
required more time for compliance.65 Another four years passed with no satisfactory progress made in 
 
60 See id. at 638. 
61 See id. at 638.  
62 See id. at 637.  
63 Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 641-42 (D. D.C. 1972).  See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D. D.C. 
1973). AHaving once determined that a state system of higher education is in violation of Title VI, and having failed during a 
substantial period of time to achieve voluntary compliance, [HEW] has a duty to commence enforcement proceedings.@ The 
court ordered enforcement proceedings to begin against Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, 
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland and Virginia within 120 days. Id. at 94. 
64 See Adams, 351 F. Supp. at 640. AHEW and all other federal agencies empowered to grant federal assistance to any 
program or activity are directed by ' 2000d-1 of Title VI to effectuate the provisions of ' 2000d . . . .@
65 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued another request to the states in non-compliance  to submit plans 
within 120 days. If  suitable plans were not forthcoming within an additional 180-day  period, compliance procedures were to 
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any of the states subject to Title VI compliance review.  In 1977, the trial court ordered that Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia be given notice that their plans were 
insufficient.  HEW was to provide Afinal guidelines or criteria specifying the ingredients of an 
acceptable higher education desegregation plan.@66 
The Adams litigation ultimately ended in 1990 with the determination by the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia that Title VI did not provide a private right of action for HEW=s failure to 
enforce its statutory provisions.67 Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg determined that Athe generalized action 
[that] plaintiffs [sought to] pursue against federal executive agencies lack[ed] the requisite green light 
from the legislative branch.@68 Although the Adams litigation ended unsatisfactorily, Title VI 
 
ensue. Adams, 480 F. 2d at 1165. The court noted that solving  higher education cases required different strategies than those 
problems solved in elementary and secondary school districts: 
 
The problem of integrating higher education must be dealt with on a statewide rather than a school-by-
school  basis. Perhaps the most serious problem in this area is the lack of state-wide planning to provide 
more and better trained minority group doctors, lawyers, engineers and other professionals. A predicate 
for minority access to quality post-graduate programs is a viable, coordinated state-wide higher education 
policy that takes into account the special problems of minority students and of Black colleges . . . Black 
institutions currently fulfill a crucial need and will continue to play an important role in Black higher 
education. 
 
Id. at 1164B65. 
66 Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D. D.C. 1977). At this time the Maryland higher education desegregation case 
was pending before the Fourth Circuit on the issue of whether or not HEW had followed statutorily mandated voluntary 
compliance procedures and Pennsylvania was in active settlement negotiations with HEW. Id. at 120. See Women=s Equity 
Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Across the years, the class of plaintiffs represented in the 
litigation grew, however, the core piece to the litigation was maintained: the allegation that certain states maintained dual 
systems of higher education. Id. In 1982, defendants moved to vacate the 1977 order and the motion was denied by the 
district court. Id. at 747. A subsequent challenge to plaintiffs= standing to sue was raised and resolved in plaintiffs= favor. 
Women=s Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F. 2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Women=s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 879 
F. 2d 880, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 190B97 (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1995). Under the administration of 
President Ronald Reagan, the Justice Department took a less aggressive posture in pursuing the enforcement of Title VI 
against the states. Id. 
67 See Women=s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding plaintiffs lacked claim 
against Department of Health, Education, and Welfare because they had alternative remedies for their injuries). 
68 Id. at 752. The Court determined that nothing in Council of and for the Blind, 709 F. 2d 1521, 1530, n. 69, Adams v. Bell, 
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enforcement by the Department of Education continued into the 1990s and the twenty-first century.  
After the United States Supreme Court decided the Fordice, the Office of Civil Rights gave notice that 
it would conduct a Fordice compliance review of the states whose desegregation plans had expired.69 
As a result of the review, the Office of Civil Rights entered cooperative desegregation partnership 
agreements with  Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, resulting in 
Fordice compliant desegregation plans.70 As of fiscal year 2005, the Office of Civil Rights was still 
monitoring the desegregation efforts of these states.71 
On the second federal lawsuit front, the United States Department of Justice filed suit in 
Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, seeking to dismantle the prior de jure systems of higher education 
and private plaintiffs have also brought lawsuits seeking to secure better funding for historically black 
colleges and universities.72 Because of their aegis in Plessy, many of these historically black colleges 
 
711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1021 (1984), or Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) evinced that Congress intended to create an implied right of action to pursue a Title VI claim against a federal 
executive agency. Women=s Equity Action League, 906 F.2d at 747. 
69See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Notice of Application of Supreme Court Decision, Jan. 28, 1994. 
70U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual Report to Congress, Higher Education Desegregation, FY 
2000; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual Report to Congress, Higher Education Agreements, FY 
2001-2004, http://www.ed.gov/about/report/annual/ocr/annrpt2004/;  Maryland Higher Education Commission, OCR 
Agreement, Maryland=s Report and The Partnership Agreement Between The State of Maryland and the U.S. 
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, available at http://www.mhec.state.md.us/higherEd/ocrplan. See 
also, Letter of  Kevin M. O=Keefe, Chairman, Maryland  Higher Education Commission to Wendella P. Fox, Director, 
Philadelphia Office of Civil Rights, United States Department of Education detailing full compliance with 
Desegregation Partnership Agreement, June 19, 2006; But see also Coalition for Equity and Excellence In Maryland 
Higher Education, et al vs. Robert Ehrlich, Jr, No 24-C-06-0081370G, Circuit Court for Baltimore City Maryland, filed 
October 13, 2006 alleging that the state of Maryland is currently maintaining a dual system of higher education in 
contravention of Fordice. The case was removed to the federal court on October 23, 2006 and an order was signed on 
January 20, 2007 administratively closing the case.  See Coalition for Equity and Excellence in Maryland v. Robert L. 
Ehrlich, Jr., et al. Civil Action NO. MJG -06-2773, (U. S. D. C. Dist. Md.), Notice of Removal (10/23/2006) and Order 
Staying and Administratively Closing Case (10/30/2007). 
71U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual Report to Congress, Higher Education Agreements, FY 
2005 , http://www.ed.gov/about/report/annual/ocr/annrpt2005. 
72 See United States v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994), on remand, 900 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ala. 1995).  The United 
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and universities have always had problems securing resource parity with other public institutions 
within the same state.  To these schools, the Brown I mandate of equal education represented an 
opportunity to receive funds to improve their status in the world or higher educational opportunity.  
Historically black colleges and universities were poised for a change after Brown I, but part of that 
change was unexpected.  The institutions that  served  them well in the world of Plessy, might actually 
cease to exist under the same Brown I mandate of equal educational opportunity.73 A most salient 
question after the Adams litigation, and as well as after the lawsuits in Knight v. Alabama/United 
States v. Alabama, Ayers v. Allain, United States v. Louisiana, and Sanders v. Ellington,74 was how 
and under what circumstances could historically black colleges continue to exist.  Each case is 
representative of the difficulty the federal court has had in fashioning a principled standard by which 
the Brown mandate could be measured and enforced in the higher education context. 
The desegregation sagas in Louisiana and Mississippi are  two of the four longest running and 
most recently settled higher education desegregation cases.  More importantly, they are representative 
of the problem with the Brown II remedy of dismantlement with Aall deliberate speed.75@ The Brown II 
remedy became the proxy for delay and entrenchment, resulting in the accentuation of problems 
created by Plessy educational regimes.  The higher education litigation in Louisiana and Mississippi 
 
States brought an action against the Alabama higher education system and private plaintiffs intervened.  Id.  See Ayers v. 
Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) and  Section IV-B; see also United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 
1981) and Section IV-A; see also Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). Sanders v. Ellington was 
brought in 1968 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in order to prevent the University of 
Tennessee from building a new facility for expansion of its educational program. The United States Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare intervened seeking an order to command the state defendants to submit a plan for desegregating its 
system of higher education. Id. 
73 See infra Section V(E). 
74See supra note 72.
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demonstrate the rocky path each system traversed while their respective federal district courts struggled 
with establishing a principled standard for constitutional compliance.  In each of these cases the federal 
court had to decide whether race-neutral admissions practices were sufficient or whether the United 
States Constitution required more affirmative actions to satisfy the Brown I mandate of equal 
educational opportunity. 
IV. The Two Cases Before the Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Fordice 
A. The Louisiana Case: United States v. Louisiana 
 The state of Louisiana is home to eleven public four-year colleges and universities.76 Southern 
University77 and Grambling University78 are the state=s historically black universities. The remaining 
institutions: Louisiana State University,79 University of New Orleans,80 Louisiana Tech University,81 
75Brown v. Board of Education II,  349 U. S. 294, 300-01 (1955). 
76See Final Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 1- 2 (February 2006).   The Louisiana State Board of 
Regents coordinates the organization and functioning of higher education system.  Under its supervision, the four-year 
institutions are part of three different Asystems@ within the higher education structure. Id. Grambling ,Louisiana Tech, 
McNeese, Nicholls, Northwestern, Southeastern, University of Louisiana at Lafayette and Monroe  universities 
comprise the University of Louisiana System. Id. 
77See History of Southern University, http://www.subr.edu/historysubr.html .  Southern University in Baton Rouge, 
New Orleans was created pursuant to Act 87 of the Louisiana General Assembly of 1880 for the education of Acolored@
people. Id. Southern University A & M, Southern University, New Orleans, Southern University, Shreveport/Bossier, 
Southern University Law Center and Southern University Agricultural Research Center comprise the Southern 
University System. See Final Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the 
Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 1-2 (February 2006).  
78See Grambling State University B History, http://www.gram.edu/about/history.asp.  Grambling State University, 
located in Grambling, Louisiana, first opened as an industrial school for children in 1900. Act Number 33 of July 4, 
1946 renamed the four-year college Grambling College. 
79See History of LSU, http://www.lsu.edu/about_ht.htm. All of Louisiana=s historically white universities were mandated 
under law to be Plessy institutions. See supra note 22. Louisiana State University received land grants from the United 
States government in 1806, 1811, and 1827 and opened in 1860 as an institution of learning for white seminarians. Id. 
LSU Agricultural Center, LSU, Alexandria, LSU A & M, LSU Eunice, LSU Law Center, LSU HSC-N. O., LSU HSC-
S, LSU-Shreveport and UNO comprise the LSU System. See Final Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement 
Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 1- 2 
(February 2006).  
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McNeese State University,82 Nicholls State University,83 Northwestern State University,84 Southeastern 
State University,85 and the University of Louisiana, Lafayette,86 and University of Louisiana, Monroe87 
are the historically white universities. Prior to the United States Supreme Court=s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education I, the state of Louisiana required separation in higher education pursuant to its 
state constitutional and statutory law.88 Post-Brown v. Board of Education I and before the higher 
education desegregation litigation, the state engaged in practices designed to prevent African 
Americans from entering its historically white colleges and universities, thus setting the stage for what 
was to be over fifty years of effort, many of them not well spent, in the quest to achieve, and 
sometimes to avoid, Brown I equality of opportunity in higher education.  
 The higher education desegregation litigation in Louisiana has been long, arduous and 
protracted.  Louisiana was one of ten states targeted for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
 
80See UNO History, http://www.uno.edu/history.cfm. The University of New Orleans was established originally as a 
New Orleans campus of Louisiana State University pursuant to 1894 La. Acts 68, ' 2432B2438.  In 1974 it was 
renamed as the University of New Orleans.  
81 1894 Act 68 ''1-7 as cited in STATE=S LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 179 (Pauli Murray ed.) Louisiana Tech 
University first opened in 1894 as Louisiana Polytechnic Institute in Ruston, Louisiana as an Aindustrial institute and 
college for the education of the white children of the State of Louisiana in the arts and sciences.@ Id. 
82See History of McNeese, http://ww.mcneese.ed/parents/history.asp. McNeese University was originally a two-year 
campus of Louisiana State University located in Lake Charles, Louisiana which opened in 1939.  
83See About Nicholls, History and Purpose, http://www.nicholls.edu/about/history.htm. Nicholls State University 
opened as a junior college division of Louisiana State University in 1948 pursuant to 1884 La. Acts 51, ' 1. It became a 
four-year institution in 1956. 
84Northwestern State University, opened in 1884 as the Louisiana State Normal College and had as its primary mission 
the training of public school teachers. It was open to white males and females. 
85See 1928 La. Acts 136, ' 1B4.  Southeastern State University, opened in 1928 for the purpose of the Ahigher education 
in the arts and sciences of white children of the State.@ Id. 
86See UL Lafayette, University History: General, http://www.ull.edu/AboutUs/History/General.shtml. The University of 
Louisiana, Lafayette opened in 1900 as the Southwestern Louisiana Industrial Institute.  
87The University of Louisiana Monroe, formerly, Northeast Louisiana State University, opened as a junior college in 
1931 and began offering a four-year degree in 1950.   
88 See LA. CONST. 1879, art. 231 which provided for the Aestablish[ment] in the city of New Orleans a university for the 
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of 1964 by the Department of Health Education and Welfare.  The original lawsuit was filed in 1974 in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.  The lawsuit targeted both Title 
VI and Fourteenth Amendment violations in respecting the state=s maintenance of a dual system of 
education.89 The defendants in the lawsuit were the Governor David Treen, the Louisiana State Board 
of Education, the Louisiana State Board of Regents, the Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State 
University and the Board of Supervisors for Southern University.  Six years passed before the first 
pretrial conference was set in the case.90 Subsequent to an eight-day pre-trial conference in 1980, the 
parties entered settlement negotiations resulting in a proposed consent decree, which was ultimately 
accepted, by the court on September 8, 1981.91 In an opinion written by Judge Charles Schwartz, a 
three-judge court found that the Consent Decree met the requisites for federal court approval.92 Crucial 
to the court=s approval was the Consent Decree=s promise to direct its efforts towards the recruitment 
 
education of persons of color . . . .@
89 United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509, 512B13 (E.D. La. 1981). In its complaint, the United States alleged that it  
tried to seek voluntary compliance from the State without success. The Fourteenth Amendment suit was waived by the United 
States after a standing challenge was raised in the case. However, since the standard for prevailing on a Title VI case is the 
same as that for prevailing in a Fourteenth Amendment case, the Title VI challenge was allowed to proceed. See also 42 
U.S.C. ' 2000d et seq; United States v. Louisiana, 9  F. 3d 1159, 1162 citing United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 
and United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717 (1992).
90 See U.S. v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. at 513. Although the Court=s involvement remained relatively limited between 1974 
and 1980, during this period the parties were engaged in discovery, the disposition of several overlapping cases and with 
certain issues of intervention. 
91 See id. at 515. In evaluating the agreement, the Court also found that the timetables provided for implementation were 
Areasonable, specific, and realistic.@ Id. The Court also determined that the consent decree=s system-wide reporting format 
would: 
 
(1) promote compliance with the plan; (2) make the process of monitoring the system=s progress simple 
and inexpensive for both state and federal government personnel; and (3) provide all the parties, as well 
as the general public, a quick and sure means of evaluating the merits of the plan as implemented, and to 
correct any unsuspected inadequacies which might be revealed thereby. 
Id. 
92 U.S. v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. at 515. AIn summary the Court finds that the consent decree which it approved in its order 
of September 5, 1981 embodies a reasonable and specific system-wide desegregation plan which promises realistically to 
work.@ Id. See Federal Judicial Center at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj. President Gerald Ford appointed Judge 
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and admission of other race students to the previously historically white and historically black 
institutions;93 the reduction of attrition of African American students at historically white institutions;94 
the reduction of program duplication created by the dual system;95 preservation and enhancement of 
historically black colleges and universities;96 increasing the presence o67f other race members in 
institutional staffing, faculties and supervisory boards.97 The Consent Decree=s term was one of 
approximately six years with an automatic expiration on December 31, 1987. 
Pursuant to the Consent Decree=s terms, on December 29, 1987, the United States requested a 
hearing to question and measure the state=s compliance with the 1981 agreement.98 Upon cross motions 
for summary judgment by the parties, the United States Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
determined that the State was liable for violations of Title VI because it had not met its responsibilities 
under the agreement.  The State still maintained a dual system of higher education.99 Judge Schwartz=s
opinion was critical of the parties= primary focus on the remedial phase of the lawsuit which he found 
 
Charles Schwartz to the Eastern District of Louisiana federal bench in 1976. 
93 U.S. v. Louisiana, 527 F Supp. at 515 (stating Consent Decree=s desegregation plan makes specific commitments to 





98 United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. La. 1988). 
99 Id. at 653B57. (stating that while the mere existence of schools predominantly one race or another is not a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment without a showing that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the 
state, Louisiana=s freedom of choice policy, allowing students to choose which college to attend, was insufficient to 
demonstrate that the state was not operating a racially based dual college education system). 
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to have resulted from a misunderstanding of the standard by which the state=s liability for constitutional 
violations was to be measured.100 
Respecting the state=s duty under the Brown mandate, it was the United States= and the state of 
Louisiana=s position,  that the appropriate measure of the state=s duty was that set by the United States 
Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday.101 Specifically, the United States argued that the Bazemore 
standard would only require the higher education system to adopt race-neutral practices in all facets of 
its operations in order to meet the Brown I requirement of equal educational opportunity.102 Judge 
Schwartz=s opinion entered the fray of this hotly debated constitutional question as had the Sixth 
Circuit in Geier v. University of Tennessee,103 as would the federal court for the Northern District of 
Alabama court in Knight v. Alabama,104 and ultimately, as would the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Fordice.105 He rejected the position of plaintiffs and defendants in the Louisiana 
 
100 Id. at____.
101 United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 654. The United States and Louisiana both argued that the Supreme 
Court=s standard in Bazemore was constitutionally sufficient.  Bazemore, if applied in the higher education context,  would 
suggest that states Asatisfied their duties in the higher education context by implementing good faith, racially neutral policies 
and practices where students are free to enroll where they wish, even where there continued to exist racially identifiable 
institutions within the state=s public higher education system.@ Id. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 388-91 (1986).  In 
Bazemore, the United States Supreme Court reviewed an attack on two North Carolina high school clubs which were 
segregated under law, but which were presently composed of students admitted on a race-neutral basis. The clubs were still 
largely identifiable by race. Id. at 391. The United States Supreme Court determined that the Green duty to desegregate all 
vestiges of prior de jure segregation in a compulsory education system, was inapplicable to clubs where memberships were 
voluntary. Id. at 409 (White, J., concurring).  
102 See United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 654.  See Halpern, supra note 66 at 191.  On the Limits of the Law 
supports the proposition that by the time the Louisiana case was on its way to the Fifth Circuit, the policy of the Civil Rights 
Division of the Reagan Justice Department was infused with  Acolor blind@ rhetoric.  Affirmative action policies were 
commonly attacked as Areverse discrimination@ and some within the administration criticized the Office of Civil Rights as 
Aoverly intrusive in the affairs of state and local governments.@ Id. It is wholly consistent with this characterization of a 1988 
Office of Civil Rights that the United States would support a Bazemore standard of constitutional compliance. Id. 
103 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979). 
104 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991). 
105 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
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case.106 Rather, Judge Schwartz determined that the standard set by the Court in Green v. New Kent 
County School District was the appropriate standard for  Brown I compliance.107 Explaining the states 
duty to provide equal educational opportunity under the command of Brown, the Court in Green would 
require higher education systems to Aeliminate all of the >vestiges= or effects of de jure segregation, root 
and branch.@108 This meant that the state of Louisiana had to Aeliminate from [its higher education 
system] all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.@109 Accordingly, the state=s higher education system 
could not merely adopt race-neutral criteria in matters concerning admissions, recruitment, 
programming and staffing. The system would be required to take Aaffirmative@ measures toward 
dismantling the prior de jure system of segregation.110 Judge Schwartz criticized the State=s
performance under the 1981 Consent Decree for Amerely enhancing the State=s black schools as black 
schools rather than towards >converting its white colleges and black colleges to just colleges.=@111 The 
 
106 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 656.  
107 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 656.  
108 Green supra at 438. 
109 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 653 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289B90 (1977). Judge Schwartz 
stated: 
 
The rationale in Green for finding that racially neutral admissions policies may at times be insufficient to 
satisfy the constitutional mandate to achieve unity [sic] systems of public education carries the same force 
in the higher education context as it does in the primary and secondary education context; all deliberate 
speed to achieve non-racially identifiable colleges is a must, just as it is for primary and secondary 
schools.  When open admissions alone fail to disestablish a segregated school system, be it 
primary/secondary school system or a college system, then something more is required . . . Had the 
Supreme Court held in Green or elsewhere that the remedies beyond open admissions policies were 
limited to policies of mandatory student assignments to particular schools or programs, then this Court 
would be more inclined to follow the approach in Ayers. Such, however, is not the case.  This distinction 
between primary/secondary education and higher education simply means that the appropriate remedy 
may well differ in the two contexts.  
 
Id. at 656. 
110 United States v. Louisiana 692 F. Supp. at 653. 
111 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 658 (quoting Norris v. State Council of Higher Ed. for Va., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 
1373 (E.D. Va. 1971)).  
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district court did not decide on a remedy at this juncture, but it strongly suggested that an appropriate 
remedy would target program duplication, the institution of a junior college system, the abandonment 
of open admissions policies and the elimination of multiple university governing boards.112 
The case was scheduled for trial to begin on September 22, 1988 on the limited issue of 
remedy, because the state=s liability had already been determined.113 However, the matter lingered on 
the docket for the Eastern District for the remainder of 1988 and for a significant portion of 1989.  To 
assist in the resolution of the litigation, court appointed a Special Master during the interim. His report 
was ultimately adopted by the district court as its own order on the issue of remedy.114 The report 
required consolidation of the multi-board university system into a single board system.115 The single 
governing board was tasked with the job of implementing the court=s order regarding the abandonment 
of open admissions policies;116 the creation of a tiered system of universities wherein they were 
classified according to mission status;117 the development of a comprehensive community college 
system;118 and  the thorough review of all programmatic offerings to remedy the problem of 
unnecessary program duplication created by proximate universities.119 The two most controversial 
pieces of the Special Master=s report requiring a single educational governing board and the merger of 
 
112 See United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 658.  
113 See id. at 644.  
114 See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 515B21 (E.D. La. 1989).   
115 See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 515.  
116 Id. at 516B17.   
117 Id. at 516.  
118 Id. at 518. 
119 Id at 519.   
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Southern University Law Center into LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center, destined the case for a return 
visit to the Fifth Circuit.120 
During the pendency the of the Louisiana case before the Fifth Circuit, the Mississippi case, 
Ayers v. Allain, was decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.121 The Fifth Circuit=s opinion in 
Ayers determined that Brown I compliance only required the low-threshold level of performance 
established in Bazemore v. Friday.122 Applied in the Louisiana context, the opinion meant that the 
once state abandoned its de jure system of segregation and replaced it with  race neutral practices, the 
higher education system was constitutionally sound..123 The district court=s remedial order was vacated 
and summary judgment was granted for the state defendants.124 It was October 30, 1990  and the Fifth 
Circuit=s Bazemore standard had now been applied in the Mississippi case and the Louisiana case.125 
B.  The Mississippi Case: Ayers v. Allain 
The state of Mississippi is home to eight public four-year colleges.  Alcorn State University, 
Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University are the state=s historically black 
colleges.126 The remaining four year institutions: University of Mississippi, Mississippi State 
 
120Id at 519; See Section V(E). 
121 Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (decided on September 28, 1990 during pendency of appeal of United 
States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) (decided on December 10, 1993)). 
122Ayers v. Allain 914 F. 2d 676, 686 (5th Cir. 1990). (stating AWe believe Bazemore...provide[s] the proper standard 
to govern Mississippi=s efforts to disestablish prior de jure segregation in its universities.@
123Ayers v. Allain 914 F. 2d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1990).  (holding, Athat to fulfill its affirmative duty to disestablish its 
prior system of de jure segregation in higher education, the state [] satisfies its constitutional obligation by 
discontinuing prior discriminatory practices and adopting and implementing good-faith, race neutral policies and 
procedures.@)
124See United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606, 608 (E.D. La. 1990) (stating that Athis Court [] finds that Ayers is 
both binding and controlling . . . @). 
125See Ayers v. Allain, 914 F. 2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990). 
126 Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1527B29 (N.D. Miss. 1987). Alcorn State University was originally established in 
1871 as a trade-school-like-college for African American males. It is located in Alcorn, Mississippi.  Mississippi Valley 
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University, Mississippi University for Women University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta State 
University are historically white universities.127 Prior to the United States Supreme Court=s decision in 
Brown I, the state of Mississippi required separation in higher education pursuant to state  
constitutional and statutory law.128 Those holding the political reigns in the state did not welcome 
Brown I.129 The Court=s decision came during same year as higher education systems Brewton Report 
- a self-examination of the status of higher education in the state.130 The report revealed deficits and 
disparities in funding and facilities, as well as in program offerings in the historically black 
institutions.131 Nevertheless, subsequent to the Brewton Report, the State of Mississippi, as had the 
 
State University was established in 1946 by Act of the Mississippi state legislature as a vocational school for African 
American students.  It  is located in Itta Bena, Mississippi.  Jackson  State University was established in 1946 to train African 
American teachers. It is located in Jackson, Mississippi.  
127 Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1525B28 (N.D. Miss. 1987). All of the State of Mississippi=s historically white four-year 
universities were mandated under law to be Plessy institutions. The University of Mississippi was established in 1844 and 
opened in 1854. Id. Mississippi State University was established in 1878, opened in 1880 and is located near Starkville, 
Mississippi. Id. at 1527. The Mississippi University for Women was established to educate white women in 1884 and it is 
located in Columbus, Mississippi. Id. The University of Southern Mississippi was established in 1910, opened in 1912 and is 
located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Id. at 1527B28. Delta State University was established in 1924, opened in 1924 and is 
located in Cleveland, Mississippi. Id. at 1528.  
128Supra note 23. 
129See John N. Popham, Reaction of South: >Breathing Spell= for Adjustment Tempers Region=s Feelings, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1954, at 1 (highlighting Governor Hugh Lawson White reportedly urged Ago slow@ approach and stating he 
said that Ahe would move for an early meeting of the Mississippi legal Education Advisory Committee [to study] 
methods to maintain school segregation if the [Supreme Court] outlawed it.@); William S. White, Ruling to Figure in 
>54 Campaign: Decision Tied to Eisenhower-Russell Leads Southerners in Criticism of Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 
1954 at 1 (quoting Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi as saying: AThe South, will not abide by nor obey this 
legislative decision by a political court.@)
130 See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Ayers v. Mabus, 1990 U.S. Briefs  6588 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6588) (citing Brewton, 
Higher Education in Mississippi (1954)) (describing equal educational opportunity goal as being Astill very distant.@). 
131 See Brief of The Alcorn State University National Alumni Association As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners, Ayers 
v. Mabus, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (No. 90-1205), 1990 U.S. Briefs 1205. In support of their argument that the state of 
Mississippi continued practices that were responsible for current segregative effects, the alumni of Alcorn University cited to 
the historical practices of the state of Mississippi respecting funding of Alcorn State University which accounted for the 
restrictions in its mission.  Id at 12.  Expenditures for Alcorn from 1934-1943 were reported to have averaged $94,000 per 
funding year, whereas it was $273,000 for Mississippi State University per funding year according to the Brewton Report. Id 
at 12. For funding year 1947-1952 $433,000 was appropriated for Alcorn whereas 1.9 million was appropriated for 
Mississippi State University according to the Brewton Report. Id. at 12. The Alcorn State University Alumni Association 
cited the Brewton Report which stated:  
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State of Louisiana, engaged in practices intended to thwart the entry of African Americans into its 
historically white universities. 
While the Title VI litigation was pending in the federal courts, Jake Ayers and other black 
citizens of the state of Mississippi filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Mississippi alleging that the state of Mississippi was maintaining a dual system of higher education 
based on race.132 The suit was filed on January 28, 1975, naming as defendants Governor William A. 
Allain, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, the State Department of 
Education and State Superintendent of Education.  The United States intervened on April 21, 1975 
alleging Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Title VI violations.  The plaintiffs claimed that 
state continued to operate a dual system of higher education based on race after the Supreme Court=s
decision in Brown, in that the state=s historically black colleges and universities were subjected to 
disparate funding and  maintenance.133 The defendants denied all Fourteenth Amendment violations.  
The position of the defendants throughout the litigation was that the existence of essentially one-race 
institutions in the system of higher education was the result of the free choice of individual students as 
 
Educational opportunities for blacks were limited to undergraduate training in teacher education, 
agriculture, mechanical arts, and the practical arts and trades while white students enjoyed extensive 
offerings at the undergraduate, graduate and professional levels. 
 
Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1528, n. 2 (N.D. Miss. 1987).  
132 Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1525 (N.D. Miss. 1987)  
133 Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1525. Plaintiffs claimed that both African American faculty and students were denied equal 
educational opportunity because of the disparities in the institutional missions of the historically black colleges; the quality 
and quantity of academic offerings; the quality of the academic personnel; the lack of land grant funding available to the 
historically black colleges; and fiscal and facilities disparities.  Id. 
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opposed to any actions of the state which perpetuated segregated institutions and that Brown I required 
no further action of the State.134 
The case went to trial before Judge Neal Brooks Biggers, Jr. in April of 1987.135 After a trial 
that lasted for five weeks, Judge Biggers made findings of fact and conclusions of law respecting 
admissions and student enrollment,136 student recruitment,137 faculty recruitment,138 institutional 
missions and academic programs,139 funding to the universities,140 and facilities.141 Guided by the 
 
134 Ayers 674 F. Supp. at 1525B26. The state of Mississippi relied heavily on the argument that Agood faith non-
discriminatory and nonracial admissions@ implemented on a state-wide basis indicated that the state had fulfilled any 
responsibilities it had respecting the provision of equal educational opportunity. Id. The state maintained that its higher 
education system was unitary and Auntainted by discriminatory actions or purposes.@ Id. 
135 Ayers, 674 F. Supp at 1523. Judges of the United States Courts, http://air.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf. Judge Neal Brooks 
Biggers, Jr. was appointed to the federal district court for the Northern District of Mississippi in 1984 by President Ronald 
Reagan and he presided over all trial phases of Ayers through its settlement in 2001. 
136 Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1530B31, 1536B39, 56. Judge Biggers= findings of fact regarding admissions standards, student 
recruitment and student enrollment revealed prior practices that tracked African American students towards historically black 
colleges and universities and away from the historically white universities. Even though the ACT was not adopted as a 
criterion for entry in any university or college in the state until after James Meredith sought admission to the University of 
Mississippi,  the current system=s policies and practices were  Areasonable, educationally sound, and racially neutral.@ Id. 
137 Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1558. Student recruitment practices suggested that the system was dedicated to encouraging 
Aminority participation in the system.@ Id. 
138 Ayers , 674 F. Supp. at 1537. Judge Biggers found that there was a substantial presence of other-race faculty members at 
the historically black colleges and universities but not at the historically white colleges and universities. He attributed the 
lack of African American professors at the historically white universities to a shortage in the pool of qualified individuals,  as 
well as to the difficulties presented in retaining them. Id. The state of Mississippi met its constitutional duty to dismantle the 
prior de jure system responsible for the current disparity in the presence of other race faculty by adopting race-neutral 
procedures for hiring. Id. at 1564.  
139 Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1538, 1561. Regarding institutional mission assignments, the court was tasked to evaluate how and 
whether the current mission  assignments of the historically white and the historically black colleges were tied to their prior 
de jure status and whether that history unconstitutionally tainted their current status. The historically white universities 
designated as  Acomprehensive@ institutions were earmarked  for funding at a higher level under state law and the court found 
no intent to discriminate. Id. at 1561. Judge Biggers also addressed the argument that there existed unnecessary program 
duplication, which placed the historically black colleges and universities at a disadvantage in attracting a white student 
population. The court dismissed this notion, stating that there was no evidence that the elimination of program duplication 
would have any effect on a student=s choice. Id at 1561. 
140Id. at 1546B48 (discussing plaintiffs= allegations that historically black institution suffered under state=s funding formula 
that preferred historically white institutions and concluding that differential funding was not intentionally discriminatory, but 
was instead connected to institution=s mission within system of higher education). 
141 Id. at 1548, 1561B62 (finding that although facilities at historically black universities at one time had been disparately 
impacted by inequities in state funding, improvements demonstrated by state between 1970 and 1986 suggested Agood faith 
affirmative effort on the part of the defendants to provide adequate facilities at the historically black institutions in 
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principle that the state had an affirmative duty to disestablish a dual system of higher education, Judge 
Biggers concluded that the state of Mississippi met that duty.142 Students were recruited and admitted 
to each of the state=s universities on a race-neutral basis,143 and faculty, staff and fiscal allocations were 
made on a race-neutral basis.144 Having established that the higher education system was administered 
on a race-neutral basis, Judge Biggers found no constitutional violations and the case was dismissed.145 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the state of 
Mississippi had not met its burden to dismantle its dual system of education. In an opinion written by 
Judge Irving L. Goldberg,146 the court corrected the trial court=s analysis of the constitutional issue. 
According to Judge Goldberg, Judge Biggers correctly selected Green147 as the measure for 
determining whether the state met its burden for dismantling the prior de jure segregation in 
education.148 However, Judge Goldberg found that Judge Biggers= reading and application of Green 
was incorrect.149 As Judge Biggers correctly recognized, Green placed an Aaffirmative duty@ on the 
states to dismantle segregated systems of higher education.150 However, Judge Biggers failed to value 
the Aroot and branch@ requirement of the elimination of all vestiges of de jure segregation.151 Instead, 
 
accordance with their defined mission.@). 
142 Id. at 1564.   
143 Id. at 1564.  
144 Id. at 1564.
145 Id. at 1564.  
146 Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf. Judge Irving Loeb 
Goldberg was appointed to the Fifth Circuit in 1966 by President Lyndon B. Johnson.  He served on the Fifth Circuit until 
his death in 1995.    
147 Green supra. 
148 Ayers, 893 F. 2d at 743. 
149 Ayers, 893 F.2d at 743B44.
150 Green, supra at 437B38. 
151 Ayers, 893 F.2d at 750.  The Fifth Circuit carefully explained how and why the rule of Green had to be understood and 
interpreted in the context of the Brown I mandate of equal educational opportunity and the Brown II remedy of 
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Judge Biggers= interpretation of Green only required the State of Mississippi to implement Agood faith 
race neutral policies and procedures@ in order to meet its constitutional responsibility.152 
Judge Goldberg=s evaluation and application of Green was based on an analysis of Green 
drawn from Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama Public School153 and Bazemore v. 
Friday.154 Joined by Judge Samuel D. Johnson Jr., Judge Goldberg wrote that the district court=s
evaluation of Green was erroneous and in turn adopted the interpretation of Green from the Sixth 
Circuit=s decision in Geier v. Alexander.155 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit evaluated the state 
universities= various admissions policies,156 the composition of the university faculties,157 the 
institutions= missions and academic programs,158 and funding,159 and determined that defendants had 
 
desegregation: 
Under Green  the creation of a unitary school system is the goal, a goal tantamount to the elimination of 
the effects of de jure discrimination, root and branch.  If a less demanding standard were adopted, images 
of inferiority would be memorialized with the force of law, contrary to the vision of Brown, because 
vestiges of discrimination would remain unaddressed.  Brown commands the application of Green in all of 
its fertility to the public university forum. Id.
152 Id. at 750. 
153 289 F. Supp. 784, 789 (M.D. Ala. 1968) aff=d, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). The plaintiffs challenged the decision of the State of 
Alabama to open a four-year branch campus of Auburn University in the physical proximity of Alabama State University, an 
historically black university. They challenged this state action as violative of equal protection. The creation of the new 
branch of Auburn University would have perpetuated a dual system of education by reducing the ability of the historically 
black college to compete for students in the same geographic area. The district court concluded Athat as long as the State and 
a particular institution are dealing with admissions, faculty and staff in good faith, the basic requirement of the affirmative 
duty to dismantle the dual school system on the college level, to the extent that the system may be based upon racial 
considerations, is satisfied.@ Id. See Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1552 (1987) rev=d, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990). 
The Ayers court interpreted the summary decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ala. State Teachers Ass=n to 
represent approval of this standard. 
154 Bazemore supra. 
155 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986); see Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 744 (1990). 
156 Ayers, 893 F. Supp. at 735-36 (discussing admission policies from 1976-1986 and effect of minimum ACT score as 
requirement for admissions). 
157 Id. at 736B38 (discussing relative composition of faculties, by observing percentages of races in level of education of 
professors, salaries, and number of administrators at each university).  
158 Id. at 738B39 (highlighting universities= institutional missions and academic programs and observing different program 
offerings and number of programs offered at each university). 
159 Id. at 741B42 (outlining funding of universities and calculating difference in average total education and general income 
per student and average total education and general expenditures per student among universities). 
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not met their duty under Green. The requirement that states transform dual systems of higher 
education into unitary systems of higher education required more than race-neutral policies.160 On 
remand, the district court was instructed to take its guidance from the Fifth Circuit=s interpretation of 
Green hoping that Aany sortie on remand will not be long or bitterly fought.@161 
A speedy resolution of the Ayers case was not to be.  An en banc vote of the Fifth Circuit162 
resulted in a rehearing of the case and a subsequent affirmation of Judge Biggers= previous decision.163 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court=s original reading of Green, and the en banc court 
determined that the state of Mississippi, had indeed, satisfied its constitutional obligation under Brown 
 
160 Id. at 753. The Fifth Circuit concluded:  AVestiges of de jure segregation permeate the public university system of 
Mississippi. Admissions policies, the racial composition of the faculty and administration, funding practices, academic 
offerings, and mission designations all perpetuate a stigma of inferiority. Contrary to the mandates of Brown and Green, a
unitary system has not been achieved.@ Id. 
161 Id. at 756.  
161 Id. at 756.  
162 The coalition of judges writing for the majority and those writing for the minority broke down across solidly partisan 
lines respecting the Presidents who appointed them. Judge John Duhe (1988-Reagan), who  previously dissented in the 
opinion of the three judge court, wrote for a majority which determined that the Green standard as interpreted by ASTA 
was correct. He was joined by Judges Thomas Gee (1973-Nixon), Will Garwood (1981-Reagan), E. Grady Jolly (1982-
Reagan), W. Eugene Davis (1983-Reagan), Edith Jones (1985-Reagan), Jerry E. Smith (1987-Reagan), Jacques Wiener 
(1990-G.H.W. Bush) and Rhesa Barksdale (1990-G.H.W. Bush). Now writing for the minority was Judge Goldberg. He 
reiterated his support of  the affirmative duty standard to dismantle the desegregated system announced in the prior three-
judge court decision. He was joined by Judges Henry Politz (1979-Carter), Carolyn Dineen King (1979-Carter), Samuel D. 
Johnson (1979-Carter). Judge Patrick Higginbotham (1982-Reagan) concurred in part and dissented in part. 
163 Ayers, 914 F. 2d at 694 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It was Judge Higginbotham=s
observation that the Fifth Circuit=s articulation of the issue in the case was wrong and in the context of a 1990  articulation 
of the issue, it was a sophisticated one: 
 
I reject Green=s application to university education because I do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment 
supports a substantive right to a particular racial mix, certainly in the absence of mandatory and state 
controlled attendance.  I am persuaded that in this context the command of the Fourteenth Amendment 
translates to fair process and here find some common ground with the majority. When a system of 
higher education presents every person with a truly equal and free choice among schools, that system 
will be constitutional. Well and good, but the long years of separatism have worn long deep tracesBso 
deep that declarations of freedom of choice draped over them are not so easily translated to real choice. 
 The force of this reality led to the much debated constitutional rule in Green, fourteen years after 
Brown v. Board II, and although I maintain that its restatement of Brown is not applicable to higher 
education, it yet informs the present question whether Mississippi is discharging its duty. 
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I and Green by Adiscontinuing prior discriminatory practices and adopting and implementing good-
faith, race-neutral policies and procedures.@164 It was September 28, 1990 and the Mississippi case was 
poised for the United States Supreme Court to grant it certiorari, well ahead of the Louisiana case. 
C. Starting Over With A Standard to Measure Unitary Status: United States v. 
Fordice and its Application in Mississippi and Louisiana 
 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ayers v. Mabus on April 15, 1991 while 
the higher education suits in Louisiana,165 Tennessee,166 and Alabama167 were still in the federal 
district and circuit courts.168 In an opinion delivered by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O=Connor,169 Kennedy, Souter and Thomas,170 the Supreme 
 
Id. 
164 Ayers, 914 F.2d at 687. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc disagreed with the panel=s adoption of the Geier standard. Id. 
at 686. Rather, the appropriate standard for determining whether the state of Mississippi met its duty to dismantle its 
formerly segregated system of education was the ASTA/Bazemore standard. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, application 
of the Green standards as interpreted in Geier in the higher education context would frustrate the goal of disestablishment 
of desegregation in colleges and universities because of the different nature of the function of choice in the decision to 
attend a university. Id. at 686-87. Additionally, the application of the Green standards as interpreted in Geier would 
frustrate the goal of diversity that is sought in higher education. Id. 
165 Supra Section IV(A). 
166 See Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F. 2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U. S. 886 (1979). By 1979, well in 
advance of any federal court in the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit had already concluded that the AGreen requirement of an 
affirmative duty applies to public higher education as well as to education at the elementary and secondary school levels.@ Id. 
at 1065. 
167 See United States v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991). On December 30, 1991,  the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama determined that the duty of the State of Alabama was to Aeliminate vestiges of 
discrimination root and branch to the extent practicable.@ Id. at 1357. Citing the standard from Board of Education v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237 (1991), the court announced that the elimination of the vestiges of discrimination, root and branch, could be 
accomplished in the state of Alabama without Aharm[ing] the unique characteristics of higher education in Alabama.@ Id. 
168Ayers v. Mabus, 499 U. S. 958 (April 15, 1991). 
169 See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (O=Connor, J, concurring). Justice O=Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she sought 
to especially establish that Ait is Mississippi=s burden to prove that it has undone its prior segregation, and that the 
circumstances in which a State may maintain a policy or practice traceable to de jure segregation that has segregative effects 
are narrow.@ Id. at 744. 
170 See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he 
emphasized the value of the historically black college or university: 
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Court settled a disagreement among the circuits respecting the constitutional measure of a higher 
education system=s compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment when segregative effects and racial 
identifiability remain after the de jure factors have been eliminated.  The Court held that the 
Bazemore standard respecting freedom of choice as the standard of constitutional compliance in the 
evaluation of current effects of past de jure segregation, in some contexts, was not the appropriate 
standard by which a state system of higher education=s compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to be judged.171 Justice White=s opinion in Fordice applied the standard of Aaffirmative action@
from Green and placed the burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that it had dismantled its prior 
dual system of racial segregation.172 The Court determined that if the Astate perpetuate[d] policies and 
practices traceable to its prior system that continue[d] to have segregative effects whether by 
influencing student enrollment decision or by fostering segregation in other facets of the university 
system and such policies [were] without sound educational justification and [could] be practicably 
eliminated, the State had not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior system.@173 
The Court identified four practices in the Mississippi system to be evaluated upon remand to the 
district court.  The district court was instructed to review the system=s admission standards,174 
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there exists >sound educational justification= for maintaining 
historically black colleges as such. Despite the shameful history of state-enforced segregation, these 
institutions have survived and flourished. Indeed, they have expanded as opportunities for blacks to enter 
historically white institutions have expanded.  Between 1954 and 1980, for example, enrollment at 
historically black colleges increased form 70,000 to 200,000 students while degrees awarded increased 
from 13, 000 to 32, 000. 
Id. 
171 Fordice at 505 U.S. at 730B32. 
172 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (placing burden on state to take affirmative action to eliminate all vestiges of  past de jure 
segregation and directing district court to consider its remedial measures in light of the standards set by the Court.).   
173 Id. at 731. 
174 Id. at 733B38. The Court found the differential admissions requirements between universities with dissimilar 
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program duplication,175 institutional mission assignments,176 and continued operation of all eight 
public universities.177 The district court was tasked to determine whether the practices contributed to 
the racial identifiability of the institutions, whether they were educationally unsound, and if so, 
whether they could practicably be eliminated.178 
1. The Mississippi Case post-Fordice 
Judge Biggers had presided over this case for more than seven years by the time the 
Mississippi case was remanded. Once again, he evaluated the structure of the higher education 
system in the state of Mississippi, considering the factors mandated by the Supreme Court.179 The 
current status of the states= higher education admissions standards, programmatic offerings, 
institutional mission assignments and numerosity of public universities, suggested to Judge Biggers, 
that they were in fact, vestiges of the prior segregated system of higher education.180 After a two 
month trial on the merits, Judge Biggers= remedial decree permanently enjoined the state from 
Amaintaining remnants and vestiges of the prior de jure system@181 and set up a Monitoring 
Committee to oversee the implementation of the terms of the court=s judgment.182 The remedial 
 
programmatic missions to be inadequately justified. It viewed these as Aremnants of the dual system with a continuing 
discriminatory effect . . . .@ Id. at 736. 
175 Id. at 738B39.  Unnecessary program duplication occurs when Atwo or more institutions offer the same nonessential or 
non-core program.@ Id. at 738. 
176 Id. at 739B41. The Court found that the institutional mission assignments adopted in 1981 had as precursors, the policies 
previously enacted to further racial segregation. Id. at 740. 
177 Id. at 741B42. The Court asked the lower court to consider Awhether retention of all eight universities itself affects student 
choice and perpetuates the segregated higher education system, whether maintenance of each of the universities is 
educationally justifiable, and whether one or more of them can be practicably closed or merged . . . .@ Id. at 742. 
178 Id. at 743.   
179 See generally Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
180 Id. at 1493B94. Judge Biggers found that although all four aspects of educational system were vestiges of prior 
discrimination, not all continued to have segregative effects. 
181 Id. at 1494. 
182 Id. at 1494. 
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decree created specific requirements of the system of higher education with respect to new 
admissions standards for first time freshmen to be implemented in 1995-1996183 and it redefined the 
institutional missions of some universities.184 Notably, his remedial decree did not require the merger 
or closure of any institutions.185 
Since Judge Biggers= initial post- Fordice ruling in 1995, the Fifth Circuit has made only one 
significant ruling in this case.186 The Fifth Circuit heard the plaintiffs= appeal challenging portions of 
Judge Biggers= decree regarding the adoption of uniform admissions standards;187 missions 
designations of universities within the system;188 program duplication issues which might result in the 
 
183 Id. at 1494 (requiring implementation of board=s proposed 1995 admissions standards in all universities for 1995-1996 
school year). 
184 Id. at 1494B96  
185 See id. at 1493B96.  In a subsequent 1999 ruling, Judge Biggers rejected the private plaintiffs= objection to the 
expansion of a branch of the University of Southern Mississippi=s programmatic offerings, but enjoined the Board of 
Trustee=s institution of differential admissions standards at this campus.  See Ayers v. Fordice, 40 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387-88 
(N. D. Miss. 1999).  The district court did not support the plaintiffs= position that adding a lower division to the curriculum 
of the University of Southern Mississippi-Gulf Coast would impede the implementation of the desegregation decree.  The 
court determined that a race-based  admissions standard allowing the entering class at the new University of Southern 
Mississippi branch to reflect the area population would be incompatible with the goals of eliminating the vestiges of de 
jure segregation sought under the Fordice standards. Id. 
186 See Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F. 3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming most of district court=s findings of fact and remedial 
decree). 
187 See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (N.D. Miss. 1995). Judge Biggers concluded that the 1987 admissions 
standards that required higher ACT scores for the historically white colleges and lower scores for historically black colleges 
were facially neutral, but had continuing discriminatory and segregative effects. The Achanneling effect@ of differential ACT 
scores combined with numerous racially identifiable institutions with duplicative course offerings in close geographic 
proximity to each other compounded the problem. Id. Judge Biggers ordered the elimination of open admissions standards 
and the adoption of proposed uniform admissions standards, which would become effective during the 1995-1996 academic 
year. Id. at 1494. Additionally, Judge Biggers determined that the practice of using an ACT cutoff score as the basis for the 
award of alumni scholarships at the historically white colleges did not contribute to the racial identifiability of the colleges. 
Id. at 1434. 
188 See Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1494B95. Judge Biggers= remedial decree required: a site-evaluation study of existing programs 
at Jackson State University; designated programmatic enhancements for Jackson State University and Alcorn State 
University; required development of practices to increase racial diversity at Jackson State University; increased fiscal 
funding for Jackson State University; ordered creation of  an Endowment Trust whose income would support other race 
recruitment and other race scholarships for Jackson State and  Alcorn State University students. 
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of merger of HBCUs and HWIs;189 the state=s funding formula for universities;190 facilities disparities 
between HBCUs and HWIs;191 hiring and salary disparities between HBCUs and HWIs;192 land grant 
assignment disparities;193 and the racial composition of higher education governing boards.194 The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court=s implementation of the uniform admissions standards within the 
system;195 determined that the trial court was in error when it declared that the use of minimum ACT 
scores for the award of scholarships at historically white universities was not traceable to the prior de 
 
189 See id. at 1494. Judge Biggers found continued and pervasive program duplication in the Mississippi system, but 
determined that program duplication did not necessarily have present segregative effects. The court ordered a study of the 
existent program duplication between Jackson State University, a historically black college and other colleges in the system,  
as well as between Delta State University and Mississippi Valley State University (located within a few miles of each other). 
Judge Biggers declined to order a merger of Delta State University and Mississippi State University in this remedial decree.
Id.
190 See id. at 1453. The trial court found no constitutional defect in the system=s current funding policies and practices. 
AAttainment of funding >equity= between the HBIs and HWIs is impractical and educationally unsound. It can neither be 
attained within our lifetime, nor . . . does it realistically promise to guarantee further desegregation.@ Id. 
191 See id. at 1457B58. The trial court found no current policies or practices that were vestiges of past de jure segregation 
respecting any differences in facilities at historically black and historically white colleges. The court determined that both 
faced similar problems respecting maintenance and repair. Id.
192 Id. at 1462. The trial court  recognized the existence of racial identifiability at the historically white colleges in the faculty 
and administrative levels, but did not conclude that the racial identifiability was wholly traceable to the prior de jure system 
of segregation. Judge Biggers seemed to revert to a neutral practices analysis that allowed for his recognition of the Asincere 
and serious efforts to increase the percentages of African American faculty and administrators at these institutions.@ Id. 
Judge Biggers commented that  all universities in the country are similarly situated because of the small size of the qualified 
pool of African Americans in the professoriate. Id. 
193 Id. at 1464-66. The trial court  found that Alcorn State University, a land grant institution,  experienced limited progress 
as a research institution and  suffered because of the prior de jure system of segregation. Id. Nevertheless, the court found 
that an attempt to apportion academic and research facilities between Mississippi State University and Alcorn State 
University would be educationally unsound. Id. 
194 Id. at 1473. The trial court found no evidence of  unconstitutional  practices in the  selection of members to the Board of 
Trustees.  Contrary to the plaintiffs= assertions, there was no evidence of practices which Aden[ied] or dilut[ed] the 
representation of black citizens on the governing board,@ nor was there evidence of any Aarbitrar[y] limit on the activities of 
the administrators of HBIs in a way that impede[ed] their ability to protect the rights of their students.@ Id. 
195 See Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F. 3d 1183, 1195 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court=s remedial decree 
respecting uniform admissions standards but remanded on the issue of remedial developmental courses, which had been 
largely eliminated under the trial court=s remedial decree. 
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jure system of segregation;196 and remanded on four other issues respecting the implementation of the 
remedial decree.197 
2. The Louisiana Case post- Fordice 
Prior to the Supreme Court=s decision in Fordice, it seemed that the Fifth Circuit=s position on 
the applicability of Bazemore would be a settled one.  However, with the Supreme Court=s final 
pronouncement on the matter, the Aaffirmative duty to dismantle . . . root and branch@ standard of  
Green required Judge Schwartz in the Eastern District of Louisiana to once again review the higher 
education system in the State of Louisiana for constitutional compliance.  Seven months after the 
Court=s decision in Fordice, Judge Schwartz reinstated the August 2, 1988 remedial order in United 
States v. Louisiana, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs.198 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that Judge Schwartz=s grant of summary judgment on the issue of liability was 
improvident.199 There were genuine issues of material facts respecting the matter of unnecessary 
program duplication and whether there existed definable educational justifications for the duplicative 
programs in geographically proximate institutions.200 Furthermore, there were genuine and material 
issues of fact respecting the various open admissions programs and whether they were responsible for 
 
196 Id. at 1228. 
197 Id. On remand, the district court was ordered:  to further evaluate the Board of Trustee=s position on the possibility of 
merger  between Mississippi Valley State University and Delta State University; to order an evaluation of the propriety of 
enhancing programs at Alcorn State University and increasing white enrollment there; to evaluate the accreditation 
attainment status of business programs at Jackson State University; and to make further findings respecting equipment 
funding disparities. Id. 
198 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19854, 29  (E.D. La. 1992). 
199 United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159, 1171 (5th Cir. 1993) (vacating remedial order). 
200 Id. at 1168B69 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing different expert opinions and stating that evidence leaves room for different 
inferences). 
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the continuing segregative effects.201 Upon remand to the trial court for the application of Fordice in 
light of the Fifth Circuit=s reversal of summary judgment, Judge Schwartz made it clear to the parties 
that this higher education case was not a Aback to the starting block@matter.@202 There was a substantial 
record in this case that could not, and would not be ignored.  Therefore, the court would only hear the 
disputed issues of fact which were defined by the Fifth Circuit.203 
V.  Structuring, Implementing and Evaluating Higher Education Desegregation Plans: Were 
the Mississippi and Louisiana Plans Designed for Success? 
The parties in the Mississippi and Louisiana cases were constitutionally bound to enter  
settlement agreements that complied with the requirements of Fordice, and the only accountability 
measures for the assurance of constitutional compliance were Judges Biggers and Schwartz.  Given the 
multiple areas for remediation, the parties in both cases should have been tremendously motivated to 
settle the lawsuits amicably because  the crafting of a remedy by a federal judge could have yielded 
harsh outcomes.204 In February of 1994, settlement negotiations in the Louisiana case resumed, 
culminating in a new Settlement Agreement in November of that year.205 The Louisiana case entered 
its ten-year Settlement Agreement approximately two years after the States Supreme Court decision in 
Fordice. Oddly enough, the Mississippi case, which provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity 
 
201 The Fifth Circuit agreed with defendant, Southern University Board of Supervisors, that the multiple-board governing 
structure in Louisiana could not be challenged under Fordice as a practice or policy  emanating from the prior de jure system 
of education because the system was established under the 1974 Louisiana State Constitution, Article VIII, Sections 5B7. Id. 
at 1166, 1170. 




to define and clarify the measure for Brown I compliance in higher education, would not settle for 
another seven years. 
Settlement negotiations in the Mississippi case began in June of 2000.206 On March 29, 2001, 
some of the private plaintiffs and the defendants entered into a Settlement Agreement and Judge 
Biggers entered a final judgment in the case on February 15, 2002, dismissing the case with 
prejudice, thus ending the Ayers litigation.207 Other private plaintiffs disapproved of the settlement=s
terms and appealed  Judge Biggers= order.208 The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court=s decision and approved the Agreement.209 Unlike the Settlement Agreement in United 
States v. Louisiana, there was no stated period of time within which the states= progress under the  
Agreement would be monitored for compliance with the standards under Fordice.210 Rather, the 
 
204See infra, Section V(E). 
205 See generally, Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana, Civil Action Number 80-3300 (E. D. La.)  
206 Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1973, at *7 (N.D. Miss. 2002) (noting that, while trial court was 
implementing its remedial plan, officials of both the state of Mississippi and United States announced that they were 
beginning negotiations to settle Ayers case). See Mississippi Plaintiffs Make First Proposal In College Desegregation 
Case, Black Issues in Higher Education. Vol. 17, Issue 17, October 12, 2000; Gina Holland, Nicholson: Ayers Case Needs 
To Be Over College Board Wants To Settle Case, SUN HERALD, June 14, 2006, at A4. 
 
207 Ayers v. Musgrove, NO: 4:75CV009-B-D, February 15, 2002.  Before he approved the parties=Settlement Agreement, 
Judge Biggers required a concurrent resolution from the Mississippi legislature indicating their support for the costly 
settlement proposal.  Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002 WL 91895 *4 (N. D. Miss. 2002).  The Mississippi state House of 
Representatives and Senate assented to the parties Settlement Agreement during the 2002 regular legislative session.  See 
House Concurrent Resolution No. 28, Mississippi Legislature, 2002 Session  Http://index.ls.state.ms.us.
208Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F. 3d 356, 365-367, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 
209 Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 375 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 951 (2004).
 
210 See Settlement Agreement Ayers v. Musgrove, Civil Action NO. 4:75CV9-B-D(N. D. Miss. 2001).
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Agreement declared that its goal was to A[achieve] the finality of the Ayers litigation.@211 With Judge 
Biggers= approval of the Agreement, came the release of the Board of Trustees and all other 
defendants from all constraints of the court=s remedial decree.212 Thus, the federal district court has 
now released the state of Mississippi from federal court oversight. 213 
The expiration of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement and the release of the Mississippi 
system from federal court scrutiny, provide an opportunity for a Fordice retrospective on both 
systems. The requirements of Fordice are not merely aspirational. They set the minimum criteria for 
measuring whether a higher education system has disestablished its dual system of higher 
education.214 Therefore, post-Fordice success requires a concerted focus on Asound educational 
practices," and it is only through this concentrated focus that states may Adisentangle@ race from 
education thereby transforming Awhite colleges@ and Ablack colleges@ to Ajust colleges.@215 
211 See Settlement Agreement Ayers v. Musgrove, Civil Action NO. 4:75CV9-B-D, p. 3 (N. D. Miss. 2001).
212 See Mississippi Settlement Agreement at 3B4. The Settlement Agreement was required to be confected and approved 
based upon compliance with the requirements of the law of Fordice. See generally Ayers, 2002 WL 91895. Accordingly, 
the Settlement Agreement was required to meet the constitutional standards for the achievement of unitary status. The 
Settlement Agreement stated A[w]hen this Agreement becomes final, the Board will be free to fulfill its constitutional and 
statutory duties and responsibilities under Mississippi law wholly unfettered by the Ayers litigation except as specified in 
this Agreement.@ See Mississippi Settlement Agreement at 4.
 
213 See Final Judgment in Ayers v. Musgrove, NO. 4-75CV009-B-D (N. D. Miss. 2002). 
 
214 See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 728 (declaring, "State does not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies 
and practices traceable to its prior de jure [sic] dual system that continue to foster segregation."). 
215 See supra note 8. 
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The Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana targeted ten areas for action under its 
ten-year plan. Governance, classification of proximate institutions, admissions criteria, community 
colleges, enhanced programmatic offerings at historically black colleges, capital outlay funding, two 
geographically proximate Plessy law schools, and other race recruitment and employment provided the 
structure for the implementation of Fordice evaluation in United States v. Louisiana.216 In contrast, 
the Mississippi Settlement Agreement focused on five areas for desegregation implementation, all 
involving changes at the state=s historically black colleges and universities.217 Summer developmental 
education, enhanced programmatic offerings at historically black colleges, structured endowments for 
the benefit of historically black colleges, capital improvement expenditures for historically black 
colleges, and legislative commitment for operational and capital improvement needs were the areas for 
action and implementation under the Mississippi Agreement.218 The parties did not carve out any areas 
of responsibility for the state=s historically white colleges.219 
There exists some cognitive dissonance respecting complete theoretical dismantlement of prior 
de jure systems under Fordice, and the standard for successful performance under any settlement 
agreement.  Intuitively, one might think that complete dismantlement under Fordice should require 
100% compliance with the terms of an agreement.  However, the courts have resolved the dissonance 
 
216 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 2B24. (November 4, 1994).  
217See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, (passim). 
218 See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 4B13 (describing both financial and academic terms of the settlement).
 
219 See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, (passim). 
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by interpreting settlement agreements in desegregation lawsuits as contracts.220 As contracts, the 
standard for successful performance is substantial compliance rather than 100% compliance with the 
terms of an agreement.221 Now that the Louisiana Agreement has expired  under its own terms and the 
higher education system in Mississippi has been released from federal court supervision, a commentary 
 
220 See Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002 WL 91895, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 2002) (stating that Mississippi=s obligations under Musgrove 
Settlement are equally enforceable as obligations under any other contract). 
221 Good faith implementation of obligations to desegregate under a Consent Decree may relieve a party to that decree of its 
duties and entitle said party to termination of subsequent litigation. See generally Lee v. Auburn City Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 
237091 (M.D. Ala. 2002). It was the intent of the drafters of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement that substantial 
performance under the Settlement Agreement meant that the State would have complied with the requisites of Fordice 
necessary as a predicate for a declaration of unitary status. Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Louisiana, CV-80-3300A, at 30 
(Nov. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Louisiana Agreement]. The Settlement Agreement in Ayers v. Musgrove was intended by its 
drafters to Aaccomplish a full, complete, and final settlement of [the case]. Settlement Agreement, Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 
4:75CV00-B-D, at 1 (March 29, 2001) [hereinafter Mississippi Settlement Agreement]. The text of the Settlement 
Agreement provides guidance in this area, however, and illustrates that the Louisiana Agreement cannot derogate the 
requirements of Brown I, Green or Fordice. United States v. Louisiana, Settlement Agreement, United States v. State of 
Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, passim (Sept. 8, 1981) [hereinafter Louisiana Settlement Agreement]. The Louisiana Agreement 
specifically states that program duplication matters will be settled under the Fordice standard. Louisiana Settlement 
Agreement at 31. All other subjects covered within the Settlement Agreement purportedly will be governed by the question 
of whether the State of Louisiana has performed its promises under the Louisiana Agreement. The Louisiana Settlement 
Agreement specifically states that if a court finds that Louisiana has complied with the Louisiana Agreement, the Court shall 
dismiss the suit with prejudice and if Louisiana has not complied, the Court shall order compliance by specifically stating 
which actions Louisiana must take in order to comply with the Louisiana Agreement. Louisiana Settlement Agreement at 
31B32. There is no authoritative case law in the higher education context on the question whether the State of Louisiana can 
be released with less than complete performance under the Louisiana Agreement. However, there is case law in context of 
elementary and secondary desegregation, which suggests that the Louisiana can be released without having rendered 
complete performance. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court considered whether the Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City could be released from federal court oversight after its substantial, but not complete, 
performance under a desegregation decree. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249B50 (1991). 
The Court determined that the appropriate question to be considered on remand was Awhether the Board had complied in 
good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable.@ Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249B50 (emphasis added). The language chosen by the Dowell 
Court and the Fordice Court require the elimination of vestiges of de jure segregation. Like the Dowell Court, the Fordice 
Court asked whether there existed policies or practices traceable to the prior de jure system which continue to foster 
segregation and are without sound educational justification. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 728. If these exist, they are to be eliminated 
to the extent practicable. Id. A reviewing Court could borrow from Dowell, in order to give content Ato the extent 
practicable,@ if it is inclined to do so and find that substantial compliance with Fordice will suffice and release the system. 
See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249B50. Here, a reviewing federal court is unlikely to be trapped by language relating to Aunitary@ or 
Adual status@ in making its evaluation of the implementation of the Louisiana Agreement. The Dowell Court=s holding would 
guide a federal court, insofar as it states Ait is a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actually 
found in the Constitution.@ Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245. The Dowell Court further noted that the term Adual@ has been used by 
the judiciary to describe an intentionally segregated school system and Aunitary@ to describe a school system which complies 
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on the structure of each Agreement and the states= progress to date is valuable in determining whether 
the states= substantial compliance has allowed its universities to reach the standard of Ajust colleges,@
erasing their racial identifiability.     Moreover, this critique is valuable in questioning whether the Ajust 
colleges@ standard requires a conclusion that the universities  be racially non-identifiable or whether 
racial non-identifiability is truly desirable or even possible.   
Critiquing the end result under the Louisiana Settlement Agreement and the current progress 
under the Mississippi Settlement Agreement can be accomplished by analyzing the states= progress 
along a continuum of  ten variables identified by a Southern Education Foundation report as necessary 
for effective desegregation of a higher education system.  Thorough and complete dismantlement of a 
prior de jure system requires:   A)creation and implementation of an effective long range state-wide 
plan; B) implementation of the state-wide plan at the institutional level; C) creation and 
implementation of individual institutional missions, each of which focuses on minority access; D) 
creation of a specific plan for student retention and continued matriculation; E) valuing community 
colleges as an integral part of equal educational opportunity; F) valuing, structuring and placement of 
the historically black college as an integral part of a diverse system of higher education; G) using 
merger and closure of the historically black institution as a last resort; H) use of public and private 
sectors in developing effective strategies for implementing the desegregation plan;222 I) ensuring 
 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245B46.
 
222 S. EDUC. FOUND., REDEEMING THE AMERICAN PROMISE, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND 
POSTSECONDARY DESEGREGATION xviBxvii (1995). ACollaborative leadership@ should be the goal when a state seeks to draw 
from the strength of all its resources in formulating a comprehensive and effective desegregation plan. One supportive 
element creating a successful desegregation effort involves reliable enforcement and oversight of desegregation efforts from 
the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice. Id. at xviBxvii, 17B18. For a critical analysis of 
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adequate financing for implementation of the desegregation plan; and J) an accountability component 
as a requirement of measurable outcomes for success and failure.223 
A. The Long Range State-Wide Plan 
The conceptualization of the desegregation efforts of a higher education system from a state-
wide problem solving approach was first enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Adams v. 
Richardson,224 in 1973 and embraced as policy by Department of HEW in 1978.225 An effective 
desegregation plan can not attempt to remedy current de facto effects of prior de jure segregation on 
a Aschool-by-school basis.@226 Of course, each institution within a system would necessarily have a 
role in implementing a sound desegregation plan.227 A well-structured and comprehensive statewide 
plan, Aembodying those specific affirmative, remedial steps which [would] prove effective in 
achieving significant progress toward the disestablishment of the structure of the dual system, 
 
variances in the aggressiveness of the Justice Department=s Title VI enforcement concomitant with changes in Presidential 
administrations, see generally HALPERN, supra note 66. Additionally, private business sector and private non-profit 
organization involvement  as co-community partners is indispensable to a successful  desegregation effort.  Interests of the 
state, the private business and the private non-profit sectors should converge with those of the community at large respecting 
the development of an  educated  citizenry. This dynamic is extraordinarily valuable in creating an Aopportunity driven vision 
of public higher education.@ S. EDUC. FOUND., at 51B52. Of these collaborative factors, the only one visible to any 
measurable respect in either the  Louisiana  or the Mississippi plan is the creation of the private sector endowment in the 
Mississippi Settlement Agreement. 
223 S. EDUC. FOUND., at xvi-xvii.
 
224 480 F. 2d 1159, 1164B66 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
225 See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164B66. see also, HALPERN, supra note 66, at 162B66.
 
226 See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164. 
227 See id. at 1164B65. 
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[addressing] the problem of system-wide racial imbalance,@ allows a dual higher education system to 
successfully convert to a unitary one.228 
The desirability of the state-wide long range plan stems from the common sense realization 
that systemic racism and racial discrimination in higher education systems evolved both under law 
and later under practices and policies.  Hence, a sea-change in the higher education systems= structure 
can not occur in an instant.  In order to cure these ills, a state must first demonstrate a sincere 
commitment to dismantlement.  In turn, a sincere commitment to change requires a structured plan 
wherein parties approach problem solving by envisioning the education system as a whole.  The 
settlement history in the Louisiana case reflects the absence of this approach, as well as the difficulty 
experienced by the parties in crafting a desegregation plan that had a realistic possibility of 
dismantling a prior de jure system of segregation, root and branch. 
 
228 See 43 Fed. Reg., at 6659; see also Adams, 480 F. 2d, at 1164B67 (reiterating need for structured state-wide plan in 
order to effectively achieve desegregation).
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The 1974 litigation in United States v. Louisiana culminated in its first Consent Decree on 
September 8, 1981.229 Judge Charles Schwartz approved the agreement after several years of litigation, 
citing the court=s preference for allowing parties to Avoluntar[ily] com[ply] with the law.@230 The 
Agreement addressed six specific matters of concern to the court:  1) admissions processes of 
institutions; 2) achieving successful matriculation of other race students in historically white and 
historically black institutions; 3) program duplication in geographic proximate institutions; 4) status of 
historically black colleges and universities; 5) hiring policies and practices of all universities respecting 
other race staff and faculty; and 6) the structure of the governing boards of colleges and universities.231 
Because the Consent Decree addressed each of these factors, the court concluded it represented a 
lawful, reasonable, and equitable remedy, which was not in derogation of public policy, and it received 
the approval of the court.232 
The 1981 Consent Decree remained operable until its expiration on December 31, 1987.233 
Annual reports critiquing the progress under the agreement were generated for each year beginning on 
August 15, 1982.234 On December 29, 1987, the United States moved to determine whether the State 
 
229 See United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. L.A. 1981). 
230 See id. at 511. 
 
231 See id. at 515 (discussing commitments made by consent decree). 
232 See id.
 
233 See Louisiana Consent Decree, at 29. 
234 Id. at 27. 
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of Louisiana had successfully performed under the Consent Decree.235 At a hearing on the matter, 
Judge Schwartz concluded that in implementing the Consent Decree, the State had not met its duty 
under Brown I.236 The United States was also critical of the state=s implementation of the agreement.  
Specifically, it was the position of the United States that the State=s failure lay in its refusal to spend 
money in support of desegregation as it had promised under the agreement.237 However, Judge 
Schwartz refocused the discussion by finding fault with the Aentire structure of the consent decree@:
If money were the sole problem, then there should still be improvement, though 
perhaps an insufficient improvement for constitutional purposes, in the 
desegregation of Louisiana=s public universities. The consent decree as implemented 
was directed more towards merely enhancing the State=s black schools as black 
schools rather than towards >convert[ing] its white colleges and black colleges to just 
colleges.238 
I suggest that Judge Schwartz=s criticism was in need of further fine-tuning.  The 1981 
Agreement was defective in two respects.  The plan=s structure focused on institutional initiatives that 
were only aspirational in nature and voluntary in practice.  Moreover, it focused on institutional 
initiatives operable under freedom of choice plans.239 When the focus of the 1981 Consent Decree 
 
235 See U.S. v Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 647.
 
236 See id. at 657 (finding that state continued to provide Apolarization and separation on a racial basis@). 
237 See id. at 658.  
238 Id.
 
239See id. at 657B59.
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became the Ablack college problem@ focusing primarily on enhancement criteria for historically black 
colleges, the opportunity for a systemic approach to problem solving was lost.240 The problem in the 
plan the lay in its failure to conceptualize the remaining vestiges of segregation in Louisiana higher 
education properly as a systemic-state-wide problem, requiring a systemic state-wide approach under 
the Adams/HEW formulation.241 The 1992 Fordice Court=s focus on vestiges of segregation in 
particular universities informing the conclusion respecting the unconstitutional status of the whole 
system brought a comprehensibility to the 1994 settlement process.  Now, a clearly articulated standard 
for unitary status informed the resultant structure of the 1994 Agreement as a state-wide plan.   
Additionally, the ten-year term of the Agreement seemed to provide a suitable framework within which 
the desegregation effort could be addressed. 
 
240 See 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree, at 17B26.  The 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree provided  various enhancements at 
the historically black colleges and universities, however, at the expiration of the agreement, the historically black colleges 
had not progressed.  They did not have the same state support or quality of facilities as the  historically white colleges.  See 
United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 657.  Student recruitment, increased access initiatives, other-race employee 
initiatives were left to individual institutions to implement without the guidance of a system-wide structure,  or 
accountability. 
 
241 The problem of the Ablack college@ as the focus of what is Awrong@ with a system of higher education existed in minds of 
the primary governmental actors during the 1970s-80s litigation in Louisiana. See generally United States v. Louisiana, 692 
F. Supp. 642 (E. D. La. 1988).   The failure to view the higher education system as whole, consisting of  historically white 
colleges and historically black colleges which were both unconstitutional products of a prior de jure system,  prevented the 
state from successfully confecting and implementing the Consent Decree of 1981. This viewpoint has currency today.  One 
need only look at the post-Hurricane Katrina discussion concerning the propriety of rebuilding the totally devastated campus 
of Southern University, New Orleans.  This historically black college can only be so readily dismissed as a valueless, 
disposable remnant of a segregated past because of the lack of psychological ownership of the institution by a system 
refusing to recognize itself  as an unconstitutional whole.  See SUNO Repair Not Reasonable, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 
17, 2005, at 6B; Will Sentell, SUNO Officials Tout Service School Offers To Underserved, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 22, 
2005, at 3B; Coleman Warner, Housing Called Critical To Recovery at SUNO; Officials Envisions FEMA Trailer Park,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at A01.
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At the time United States v. Louisiana settled in 1994 and Ayers v. Fordice settled in 2001, 
both Judge Schwartz and Judge Biggers were faced with parties who were contenders in two of the 
longest running higher education desegregation cases on record.242 The protraction of these pieces of 
litigation speaks to the intractable nature of solving firmly entrenched segregative practices post-
Brown I and II. Further, it  demonstrated why the parties could not easily come to an amicable, 
constitutional settlement amongst themselves.  Whether it was the judges who were structuring and 
imposing a remedy, or whether, as the facts eventually revealed, the parties themselves developed an 
appropriate remedy, a salient question in resolving the Louisiana, as well as the Mississippi litigation, 
was the question of time and timing. 
How much time is needed for effective implementation of the desegregation plan is a question 
of critical importance.  A very important facet of both the Mississippi and Louisiana Agreements was 
the requirement that they be calculated to operate for a sufficient length of time, thus producing the 
desired long-range effects. A well-structured plan must prescribe the length of time within which the 
higher education system must be monitored for compliance with the terms of the decree, thus setting a 
baseline for when the systems may seek a Declaration of Unitary Status from the court. One incentive 
for full and timely compliance with the directives under the Louisiana agreement was the hope of 
certain release from federal court oversight within some definitive and foreseeable period of time. 
As a creation of recent history, the effectiveness of the Mississippi Agreement has yet to be 
proven.  With the Supreme Court=s denial of certiorari in Ayers on October 18, 2004, the Settlement 
Agreement became effective and the federal court released the system from oversight and retained 
 
242 See notes 71 and 72.   
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jurisdiction only to enforce the terms of the Agreement.243 The federal court=s supervisory powers 
extend solely to enforcement of several of the funding provisions, which are to be provided over a 
period of several years.244 However, several provisions within the Agreement can not fully evaluated 
until the passage of time respecting the funding that implements them.245 In some instances, the state 
of Mississippi will require a minimal period of seventeen years before a full evaluation can be made 
respecting the effectiveness of its desegregation efforts, even though it has been released from federal 
court supervision.246 The theoretical question that remains is whether the higher education system 
should have been released  until all of the Ayers funding  ended. 
Finally, there exists a question respecting the failure of both plans to comprehensively view 
their public school systems and their higher education systems as a gestalt.  Both Mississippi and 
Louisiana  had  histories of de jure segregation in their elementary and secondary public schools.247 
Problems in eliminating vestiges of segregation in a prior de jure system of higher education are 
 
243See Ayers . Thompson, 543 U. S. 951 (2004); see also Final Judgment in Ayers v. Mabus, NO. 4:75CV009-B-D at 
4, (N. D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2002). 
 
244 The summer development programs were  established and are to be continually funded for a period of eight years. These 
funds were to be provided over and above all financial assistance that was available at the time of 1995 settlement 
agreement. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 15 (Feb. 15, 2002). The publicly and privately funded endowments were 
established and are to be continually funded over a fourteen-year period. Id. at 9B12. Capital outlay projects for Alcorn State 
University, Jackson State University, and Mississippi Valley State University were authorized for  a period of five years from 
the date of implementation of the agreement. Id. at 12B14. The Settlement Agreement required the Mississippi legislature to 
create special Ayers funding over and above the funding  previously identified in the Agreement for specific academic 
programs at Alcorn State University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University for a period of 
seventeen years. Id. at 14B16.
 
245 See id. generally.
246See id generally. 
247 See notes 22 and 23. 
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inextricably bound to problems of prior de jure segregation in public school education.248 Necessarily, 
many problems related to the availability of equal educational opportunity in higher education owe 
their origins to inadequacy of both opportunity and outcomes in elementary and secondary education. 
An effective state-wide plan for dismantling the prior de jure segregation in both states= higher 
education systems should have accounted for any vestiges of segregation that lingered in the public 
education system.  The Louisiana plan did not address the college preparation problems that existed in 
the state respecting the transition from high school to the university.249 The Mississippi Settlement 
Agreement addressed the matter, but only to a limited degree by authorizing state financial support for 
summer school pre-university enhancement programs for African American students.250 
B. Institutional Implementation of the State-wide Plans and Making Access An 
Institutional Mission 
 
248 See S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 222, at xviBxvii (discussing problems with de jure segregation and some proposed 
solutions).
 
249 The 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree addressed the relationship between secondary school preparation and college entry 
more substantively than the 1994 Settlement Agreement. See Louisiana Consent Decree of 1981, at 21. The  1994 Louisiana 
Agreement addressed  high school-university relations for the sole purpose of acclimatizing the high school student to the 
other- race university environment.    See Louisiana Settlement Agreement at 21 (stating that the programs Ashall be designed 
to reduce the strangeness and alienation students often associate with other race institutions.@)
250 The summer program was designed to  bridge the gap between twelfth grade and freshman year in college. The program 
was first proposed as a remedy of the court in 1995 and it was incorporated into the 2001 Settlement Agreement. Mississippi 
Settlement Agreement, at 5. It was to be funded for ten years. See also Summer Program as originally proposed in the 
remedial proposal of the court in Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1478B79 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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Although the higher education systems in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana are viewed by 
the Court as an entirety or a whole, their respective desegregation plans should require each university 
in the system to perform an active role in eliminating the vestiges of the prior de jure system of 
segregation in order to be successful.  In its plan of implementation, each university should focus on 
access to quality higher education for students whose opportunity at their respective institution was 
formally foreclosed under the de jure system of segregation.251 Each institution should pay more than 
lip service to access for students of color and historically disadvantaged students as an institutional 
goal.  In the Louisiana Settlement Agreement, each university was tasked to perform a particular role 
in desegregating the system.252 In the Mississippi Agreement, however, the fulcrum of the parties=
agreement respecting institutional implementation and access rested heavily on historically black 
colleges and universities.253 Maintaining and enhancing the programmatic offerings and the facilities at 
the historically black colleges was the entire focus of the Agreement.254 The Agreement contained no 
terms placing new  institutional commitments on the historically white colleges for eliminating 
 
251 See S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 222, at xviii (discussing proposed implementation plans).
 
252 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22 (describing institutional responsibility for other race recruitment and 
retention); Id. at 23B24 (explaining institutional responsibility for other race recruitment in employment in university).
 
253See Ayers Settlement Agreement (passim). Other race presence at many historically white institutions within the system 
was much higher than at historically black institutions.  See infra note 392 .  See also  AAUP, Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities: Recent Trends (2007), (stating that A[t]erms of [the] agreement apply only to the three historically black 
universities in Mississippi, since the five historically white universities have surpassed the minimum of 10 percent for 
nonwhite enrollment.@
254See Ayers Settlement Agreement (passim). 
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vestiges of prior de jure segregation.255 The court ordered each historically black college or university 
within the system to Adevelop, implement, strengthen, review and modify@ certain programs in 
accordance with the requirements of Fordice.@256 Additionally, the income generated from the Public 
and Private Endowments created by the Settlement Agreement for the benefit of Alcorn State 
University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University were specifically 
designated for Aother-race marketing and recruitment, including employment of other-race recruiting 
personnel and award of other-race student scholarships.@257 
255 According to the Settlement Agreement, the status of the historically white universities at the time of the Settlement 
Agreement was frozen when the Agreement became effective  and A[t]he only  obligations of the Board [of Trustees], and 
other defendants, arising out of or related to the Ayers litigation [were] those specified in [the] Agreement.@ See id. at 4.
 
256 This Mississippi Settlement Agreement required the Alcorn State University to apply this standard to develop, 
implement, strengthen, review or modify its:  Masters of Business Administration (Natchez); Master of Accounting 
(Natchez); Bachelor of Finance (Lorman); Masters of Finance (Natchez); Physician Assistant Masters (Lorman); 
Biotechnology Masters (Lorman); Bachelor of Computer Networking (Vicksburg); and Bachelor of Environmental Science 
(Lorman).  See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 6. The Jackson State University was ordered to develop, implement, 
strengthen  or review its:  Ph.D. In Business; Masters in Urban Planning; Ph.D. in Urban Planning; Ph.D. In Social Work; 
Bachelor  in Civil Engineering; Bachelor  of  Computer Engineering, Bachelor of  Telecommunications Engineering; 
Masters of Public Health; Bachelor of  Healthcare Administration, Masters in  Communicative Disorders; Ph. D. In Higher 
Education, and Ph.D. In Public Health.  See id. at 6B7.  The Mississippi Inter-institutional Pharmacy Initiative as well as 
Jackson State=s School of Allied Health; School of Public Health; and School of Engineering were also subject to this 
provision of the plan.  Lastly, Mississippi Valley State University was ordered to develop implement, strengthen or review 
the:  Bachelor of  History; Masters in Special Education; Bachelor of  Special Education; Masters of Computer Science; 
Masters in Bioinformatics; Masters in Leadership Administration and Masters in Business Administration. See id. at 7. The 
development, implementation, strengthening or reviewing of the programs  must  be in concert with Asound educational 
practices@ and Aresources available over time.@ See id. at 5.  The federal court expects substantial implementation and 
enhancement of these programs over the seventeen-year period of funding. See id. at 5.
 
257 Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 9.   The Settlement Agreement defined other race as Apersons who are not African-
American.@ See Mississippi Settlement Agreement at 10.  n. 2.  
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A significant focus of the Louisiana Agreement addresses the Fordice program duplication 
factor.258 The Agreement was designed to provide programmatic enhancements and differentiation at 
the historically black colleges.259 The three historically black colleges agreed to establish and 
implement new programs for the express purpose of Aattracting other race students.@260 Prior to the 
effective date of the Settlement Agreement, each proximate geographic pairing of  historically white 
universities and historically black universities were operating under agreements which offered joint 
degree programs, dual degree programs or cooperative programs wherein cross-registration between 
universities was allowed.261 All of these programs were continued and some were expanded under the 
1994 Settlement Agreement.262 Each university in the system agreed to Adevelop a comprehensive 
program for recruitment and retention of other race students, faculty, administrators, and staff.@263 
258 See generally id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 10.  The Louisiana Agreement defined other race students as A@white persons at predominately black institutions 
and black  persons at predominately white institutions.@ Id at 8 n. 4.   During the term of the Settlement Agreement, 
Southern University in Baton Rouge agreed to develop and implement programs  missing in their curricula including, four 
doctoral degree programs, five masters degree programs, and four baccalaureate/associate degree programs. Id. at 10B11. 
Southern University in New Orleans agreed to implement Masters Degree in Criminal Justice that had previously been 
approved by the Board of Regents. Id. at 11B12.  Southern University, New Orleans agreed to develop and implement a 
Masters Degree in Transportation, Masters Degree in Substance Abuse, Masters Degree in Teaching, and a Masters 
Degree in Computer Information Systems. Id. at 12B13. Grambling State University agreed to develop and implement a 
Ed. D. degree program, two masters degree programs and four baccalaureate/associate degree programs. Id.
 
261 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 16. 
262 Id. at 16B17. Louisiana State University the flagship historically white college and Southern University  agreed to 
structure undergraduate and graduate degree programs to encourage graduates of the respective institutions to enter 
graduate degree programs at the accepting institution as Aother-race@ students. 
 
263 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22.
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Finally, the Louisiana agreement required each university within the system to create and develop a 
program to recruit and retain other race students, faculty, administrators, and staff.264    
C.  Student Retention and Persistence as the Measure of Success 
Statistics suggest that the retention rates for white students in college tend to be higher than 
retention rates of African American students.265 The trial court=s findings in Ayers v. Fordice support 
the truthfulness of this statement.266 A successful desegregation plan must not only focus on access to 
equal educational opportunity but must also make student retention and student persistence the focus 
of its measure of achieving success.  Just as student persistence is the indicator of the individual=s
success and performance,267 student retention is the indicator of the institution=s success and 
performance.268 Each is a measurable outcome.  Research has also shown that there exists a direct 
 
264 Id. at 23B24.
 
265 See Ayers v. Fordice, 1995 WL 1945428, at *44 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (finding that retention rates tend to be lower 




267 AStudent persistence to the completion of educational goals is a key indicator of student satisfaction and success.... 
 If information on students= goals is collected, preferably at the beginning of each [academic] term, then whether an 
individual student persists to the completion of his or her educational goals can be measured.@ Randi S. Levitz, 
Strategic Moves for Retention Success, 108 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 31 (1999).
 
268 According to Levitz: 
Retention . . . is not the primary goal [of the university], but it is the best indicator that an institution 
is meeting its goal of student satisfaction and success. It is a measure of how much student growth 
and learning takes place, how valued and respected students feel on campus, and how effectively 
the campus delivers what students expect, need, and want. When these conditions are met, students 
find a way to stay in school, despite external financial and personal pressures. In sum, retention is a 
measure of overall Aproduct.@ Id.
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proportional relationship between retention and a student=s academic ability.269 Moreover, the 
student=s ability to persist from the first to the second year is one of the most important factors 
influencing the institution=s graduation rate.270 In general, national graduation statistics rank 
Mississippi and Louisiana well below the top ranked states reporting six year graduation statistics for 
four- year institutions.271 In both states, six year graduation rates at the historically black institutions 
tend to lag behind historically white institutions, but tend to be somewhat similar to institutions 
within their same Carnegie Classification.272 Six year graduation rates for African American students 
at the historically white colleges in both states tend to be lower than those of white students.273 As a 
 
269 See id. at 32 (listing empirical data showing relationship between academic achievement and retention rates). 
270 See id. at 36 (establishing connection between achievement between the first and second years). 
271THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, Measuring Up 2006: The 
State Report Card on Higher Education, Mississippi at 10 and THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
AND HIGHER EDUCATION, Measuring Up 2006: The State Report Card on Higher Education, Louisiana at 10.  
Six year graduation statistics for the state of Mississippi were at 41% in 1992 and 51% for 2006 in contrast with the 
state of Louisiana where the six year graduation statistics were 33% in 1992 and 39% in 2006.  The top ranked states 
in 2006 reported six year graduation statistics of 64%. Id. 
272The Education Trust, College Results Online, http://www.collegeresults.org/search2d.aspx?y. See also Change, 
Rethinking and Reframing The Carnegie Classification, Sept./Oct. 2005, Vol. 37, No. 5, pgs. 50-57.    The 1997-
2004 six-year graduation rates at Louisiana=s historically black colleges were (Carnegie Classification indicated in 
parenthesis): Grambling State University(Master=s Small), 37.7%; Southern University(Master=s Large), Baton 
Rouge 26.6%; and Southern University(Master=s Medium), New Orleans, 11.7%. Id. The 1997-2004 six-year 
college graduation rates at Louisiana=s historically white colleges were: Louisiana State University (Research, Very 
High), Baton Rouge, 55.8%; Louisiana Tech University (Doctoral/Research), 51.5%; University of Louisiana, 
Lafayette (Research High), 32.3%; Northwestern State University (Master=s Large), 31.1%; McNeese State 
University (Master=s Large), 29.4%; University of Louisiana (Master=s Large), Monroe 27.3%; Nicholls State 
University (Master=s Medium), 26.6%; Southeastern Louisiana University (Master=s Large), 25.3%; University of 
New Orleans (Research High), 24.5%; Louisiana State University (Master=s Medium), Shreveport, 13.3%. Id.  The 
1997-2004 six-year graduation rates at Mississippi=s historically black colleges were: Alcorn State University 
(Master=s Medium), 42.7%; Mississippi Valley State University (Master=s Small), 40.5%; Jackson State University 
(Research High), 39.7%.  Id. The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates for the historically white colleges were: 
Mississippi State University (Research High), 57.7%; University of Mississippi(Research High), 54.4%; University 
of Southern Mississippi (Research High), 48%;and Mississippi University for Women (Master=s Small), 36.9%.  Id.
273The Education Trust, College Results Online, http://www.collegeresults.org/search2d.aspx?y. The 1997-2004 six-
year graduation rates for African American students  (AA) compared to white students (W) at the historically white 
colleges in Louisiana were: Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (AA, 44.6%, W, 57.1%); Louisiana Tech 
University (AA, 35%, W, 54.3%); Northwestern State University (AA, 23.5%, W, 34.5%); University of New 
Orleans (AA, 20.3%, W, 26%); University of Louisiana, Monroe (20.3%, W, 31%); University of Louisiana, 
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matter of sound educational policy and service to the citizenry of the states, both desegregation plans 
represented an opportunity to address the academic aspects of retention toward the ultimate goal of 
increasing both states= six-year graduation rates for not only for African American students, but for all 
students enrolled in the states= universities.  The Mississippi Settlement Agreement addressed the 
academic component of retention,  however, the Louisiana plan was inadequate in this respect. 
Prior to the 1995 remedial order in Ayers each of the eight public universities in Mississippi 
offered remedial course work as a means to supplement students who were deficient in some area of 
core freshman study.274 Judge Biggers= 1995 remedial order eliminated the greater portion of these 
remedial courses and substituted an intense summer developmental program.275 Judge Biggers found 
that African American student retention rates were lower than    those of white students system-
wide.276 As a response, he adopted the Board of Trustees= uniform admissions program that provided 
 
Lafayette (AA, 19.9%, W, 36.6%); McNeese State University (AA, 19.3%,W, 31.9%); Southeastern Louisiana 
University (AA, 18.6%, W, 26.5%); Nicholls State University (AA, 9.7%, W, 31.1%); Louisiana State University, 
Shreveport (AA 7.9%, W, 14.6%).  Id. The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates for African American students (AA) 
compared to white students (W) at the historically white colleges in Mississippi were: Delta State University (AA, 
44.6%, W, 47.3%); Mississippi State University (AA 44.4%, W, 61.6%); University of Southern Mississippi (AA 
41.6%, White, 50.5%); and Mississippi University For Women (AA, 32.5%, W, 36.7%). Id. 
274 See Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F. 3d 1183, 1201 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing previous arrangement for providing remedial 
education).
 
275 The Court of Appeals ordered a remand on the propriety of the elimination of the remedial courses at Mississippi 
universities. See Ayers, 111 F. 3d at 1202, 1228.
 
276 Judge Biggers reported the following statistics in his opinion respecting retention rates for white students and African 
American students measuring from the 1985 academic year through 1991: 47.7% white students entering college in the 
1985 academic year graduated after four years, while only 29.4% African American students entering college in 1985 
graduated after four years. The opinion also stated that retention and graduation rates for African American students were 
higher in the historically white universities. The respective African American/white student retention rates for specific 
universities within the system measuring from the 1985 academic year were: Alcorn State University, 27.2% African 
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for a spring placement process for high school seniors, coupled with a summer developmental program 
for qualifying students.277 The subsequent Settlement Agreement in Ayers did not abandon the focus 
on retention initiatives.  The Settlement Agreement provided for the maintenance and implementation 
of a summer developmental education program that had been established under a prior Consent 
Decree.278 The program offered summer preparation for any student who sought admission to a 
Mississippi college or university, but whose indicators suggested that the student might be at risk 
respecting the student=s ability to successfully matriculate at the university.279 
Much of the student-oriented text in the Louisiana Settlement Agreement focused on the 
financial aspect of recruiting and retaining of other race students, to the detriment of a more balanced 
approach, which should have also focused on the academic implications of retention.280 According to 
 
American, 62.5% white; Jackson State University, 27.3% African American, 11.1% white; Mississippi Valley State 
University, 24.1% African American, 48.8% white; Mississippi State University, 37.3% African American, 52.4% white; 
University of Mississippi, 42.1% African American, 48.8% white; University of Southern Mississippi, 39.7% African 
American, 40.3% white; Delta State University, 34.7% African American, 47.3% white; Mississippi University for Women, 
40% African American, 41.5% white.  Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1469, 1470, n. 253 (N. D. Mississippi 1995).
 
277 Id. at 478 (explaining both facets of the admission procedure). 
278 See Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1478. In 1995, Judge Biggers ordered adoption of the Board of Trustees= 1995 admissions 
standards for admission to Mississippi colleges. See Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1478, 1494. The new admission standards 
eliminated the existence of open admission for any Mississippi university and provided spring evaluations of high school 
seniors who failed to qualify for admission under the regular admission standards. See id. at 1478. If students passed the 
spring academic screening process, they would be admitted to the university. See id. If a student=s performance on the 
academic screening test was unsatisfactory, a summer development program was available to bridge gaps between a 
student=s high school preparation and skills needed for success in the freshman year. See id. at 1478B79. The 2001 
Agreement ordered Board of Trustee funding for the summer developmental program in the amounts of $500,000 for fiscal 
years 2002-2006 and $750,000 for fiscal years 2007-2011. See Final Judgment, Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 
at 4B5 (Feb. 15, 2002). These appropriations are designated for use by students who qualify for admission to the summer 
developmental program. Id.
 
279 See Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1478. 
280 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22.
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the text of the Settlement Agreement, each university=s plan of implementation had to include 
provisions for other race admissions officers, equal opportunity statements, public information efforts, 
developing relationships between high schools and colleges, and other race scholarships for graduate 
students.281 The Agreement=s limited requirements for academic retention efforts permitted each 
university to address these issues or not, in its individual plan of implementation.282 The reports of the 
Monitoring Committee reflected this shortcoming.  In each of the ten yearly reports,  the Monitoring 
Committee addressed the recruitment efforts of the various state universities but none of the reports 
revealed implementation of any  retention programs.283 
However, respecting the two geographic proximate state law schools in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, the Agreement contained specific requirements concerning retention efforts.284 LSU Law 
Center, the historically white institution, was required to create and implement a plan for recruiting and 
 
281 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22. 
 
282 Settlement Agreement, at 20B22.
 
283 Ninth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 37B39 (May 2004); Eighth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation 
Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 
33B35 (May 2003); Seventh Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the 
Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 29B31 (May 2002); Sixth Annual Evaluation 
of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of 
Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 29B31 (May 2001); Fifth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, 
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 33B34) (May 2000); 
Fourth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United 
States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 29B30 (May 1999); Third Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation 
Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 
32B33 (May 1998); Second Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the 
Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 27B29 (May 1997); First Annual Evaluation of 
the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, 
No. 80-3300A, at 18B19 (May 1996).  
284 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 19. 
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retaining more African American students.285 Southern University Law Center, the historically black 
institution, agreed to provide academic support activities for students at risk for attrition.286 
 D.  The Community College System as a Component of Equal Educational 
Opportunity 
A key component to developing and implementing an effective higher education desegregation 
plan requires states to increase access to their institutions. Community colleges can serve this function 
well.  However, under prior de jure systems of higher education, community colleges were not used 
towards this end, thus not realizing their full potential.  Effectively, they were a shield - a tracking 
mechanism protecting some institutions in the higher education system from desegregation.287 A 
 
285 Id. The Agreement  was to contain: admissions exceptions for applicants with reasonable likelihood of success in 
academic programs; A[a] comprehensive plan for contacting potential applicants; significant financial assistance; a special 
admissions officer responsible for recruitment, and pre-enrollment preparatory programs.@ See id. The LSU plan was 
implemented effective the 1995-1996 academic year. Id. The reports of the Monitoring Committee acknowledged improved 
retention rates at LSU Law Center for African American students since the implementation of the Settlement Agreement. 
For the reporting year 1999 through 2002, LSU Law Center reported retention rates for first year students: 1) 1999, African 
American students, 61%, all first year students, 79%; 2) 2000, African American students, 82%, all first year students 82%; 
3) African American students, 74%, all first year students, 88%; 4) 2002, African American students, 83%, all first year 
students, 92%. Ninth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 34 (May 2004). LSU Law Center implemented and 
continues to maintain a Pre-Law Legal Methods Program for all students considered at risk for first year attrition. Id. at 33.
 
286 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20. In accordance with Agreement requirements, Southern University Law Center 
implemented an academic support program for students effective the 1993-1994 academic year. For the 1995-1996 
reporting year, Southern University Law Center=s Academic Assistance Program consisted of a Pre-Law Summer Program 
open to students considered at risk for attrition during the first year; an Academic Assistance Program during first year of 
law school for all students irrespective of Aat risk status@; and an Academic Counseling Service. First Annual Evaluation of 
the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, 
No. 80-3300A, at 16 (May 1996).
 
287 S. EDUC. FOUND., supra 222, at 30.  Twelve states formerly operating dual systems of education, had community 
colleges systems which were largely populated by minority students because of the institution=s lower admission standards.  
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comprehensive and effective desegregation plan, however, uses the community college system in a 
manner that recognizes it as a full partner,  a sword in the desegregation effort. If the community 
college system is organized to foster easy articulation between the system=s two-year colleges and four-
year institutions, and true student choice is operational as opposed to the situation under prior de jure 
segregation practices, the community college can achieve its place in fulfilling access to equal 
educational opportunity.288 
When the Louisiana case was originally filed in 1974, there was no separate state-wide 
community college system.289 Three community colleges were named as defendants in the lawsuit, 
but there was no Asystem@ to name as a defendant or to address remedially.290 Nevertheless, 
recognizing the need to remediate the state=s significant high school drop-out rate as well as the need to 
increase accessibility to four-year colleges,  Judge Schwartz=s 1989 remedial order mandated the 
 
Statistics for first time, full time freshman African American students enrolled in two year institutions in 1991 were:   
Alabama, 56%; Florida, 78 %; Georgia, 45%; Kentucky, 28%; Louisiana 25%; Maryland, 40%; Mississippi, 58%; North 
Carolina, 37%; Pennsylvania, 33%; Tennessee, 37%; Texas, 39%; Virginia, 21%. Id at 30.
 
288 See id. (noting concern regarding rates of transfer between two and four-year colleges).
 
289United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 503 (E. D. La. 1989).  
290Id. One community college was named as an original defendant and two others were subsequently named as 
defendants in amended complaints.  See United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 645, 647 (E. D. La. 1988). 
(stating that Delgado Community College was named as defendant in original suit and Bossier Community College 
(BPCC) and St. Bernard Parish Community College (SBPCC) were named as defendants in amended complaints). At 
the time, both institutions were supervised by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) and the 
Bossier Parish School Board (BPSB).  Id at 658.   In 1988, the trial court granted summary judgment to BESE and 
BPSB on the issue of liability because neither of the community colleges under their supervision had Aany history of 
segregation@ and no evidence was produced to prove that they Aoperated on anything but a fully integrated basis and 
their supervising boards, which [were] wholly separate from Louisiana=s four higher education boards, [had not] 
discriminated in any fashion against minorities.@ Id at 658. 
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establishment of a community college system in the state.291 However, the Fifth Circuit=s subsequent 
1990 decision in Ayers required Judge Schwartz to grant summary judgment for all Louisiana 
defendants and vacate his prior remedial order which included the creation of the community college 
system.292 When the parties drafted their 1994 Settlement Agreement, post Fordice, they saw no need 
to incorporate the community college desegregation partnering plan as broadly as had been defined by 
Judge Schwartz in his 1989 order and Judge Schwartz approved the Agreement without its 
inclusion.293 The final 1994 plan partnered with the community college in its four-year college 
desegregation effort,  but only to very limited extent.  The plan only required the creation of a 
community college in Baton Rouge in an effort to foster better retention and matriculation at the four 
year colleges in the area.294 This narrow community college focus suggests that parties can, in fact, 
 
291United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 509 ( E. D. La. 1989).  The trial court ordered the creation of a 
Asystem@ of community colleges with open admissions standards . Id. The community college system was to 
incorporate the existing community colleges organized under one Board. Id. By the 1993-94 academic year, the 
community colleges were to assume the all responsibility for higher education  remedial programming, thereby 
eliminating remedial educational programming  from all four-year institutions. Id at 518.  
292See U.S. v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499 (E. D. La.1989); Ayers v. Allain, 914 F. 2d.  676 (5th Cir. 1990), and  U. 
S. v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606, 608 ( E. D. La. 1990).  
293The Louisiana State legislature ultimately provided the vehicle through which a community college system was 
created.  See Louisiana Senate Bill No. 1 First Extraordinary Session, 1998 and Louisiana Senate Bill No. 2, First 
Extraordinary Session, 1998 providing for a voter initiative to amend the Louisiana State Constitution to create a 
community college system. See also, Regents Chief Lauds Voter Backing on Education, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, 
Nov.23, 1998, B4; Ed Anderson, Community College Plan Top Amendment on Ballot 18 Changes Proposed For 
State Constitution, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 23, 1998, A3; Ed Anderson, Foster Quietly Signs Community 
College Bill, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, May 8, 1998, A3. 
294 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 4, 8B9. The  Agreement required  the community college=s curriculum to 
emphasize: A remedial education courses to prepare academically disadvantaged students for the opportunity to 
pursue baccalaureate and higher programs at other institutions.@ Id. Additionally, the Agreement required an 
articulation agreement between the community college and the four-year institutions. Id. at 9. The Baton Rouge 
Community College was established pursuant to La. R. S. 17: 3222 in 1995 and opened with the beginning of the 
1998-1999 academic year. See Baton Rouge Community College, Foundation, Quick Facts. 
http://www.brcc.cc.la.us/foundation/facts.php. The institution has an open admissions policy as mandated by the 
Settlement Agreement.  See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 4.  It provides transfer degree programs with the 
Associate of Liberal Arts, Associate of General Studies and the Associate of Science in General Science degrees. 
Ninth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
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settle within narrower constitutional parameters, than might be identified by a judicially crafted 
remedy. 
By contrast, the Mississippi Settlement Agreement is totally lacking in community college 
desegregation partnering.  Mississippi has a substantial community college system.295 However, the 
parties declined to include its community college system in its desegregation effort.  The previous 
1995 remedial order in Ayers recognized the value of the community college system as a co-partner in 
desegregation problem solving, but the final Settlement Agreement contained no collaborative 
coordination between community colleges and the state=s four year institutions.296 The failure 
represents a missed opportunity to foster better retention and improved graduation statistics at the 
state=s four-year institutions. 
E. The Historically Black College As An Integral Part of a Diverse System of Higher 
Education: Merger and Closure as a Last Resort 
 
Tension exists between the historically black college as an integral part of a diverse system of 
higher education and the Fordice requisites respecting dismantling a prior de jure system of higher 
education by eliminating all vestiges of segregation.  The words of Justice White in Fordice ring loud 
and clear respecting the remedial relief sought by the private plaintiffs in the case: 
 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 18 (May 2004). 
 
295 See IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Miss. Pub. Univ.s, See generally Mississippi 
Settlement Agreement. http://www.ihl.state.ms.us/universities.html.
296See Ayers at 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1475B76 (N. D. Miss. 1995) stating: A[T]he state, it appears is losing a valuable 
resource in not coordinating the admissions requirements and remedial programs between the community colleges 
and the universities. Such coordination has not been proposed to the court, but the court will direct the Board to 
study this area and report to the Monitoring Committee.@ Id. 
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If we understand private petitioners to press us to order the upgrading of Jackson 
State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley State solely so that they may be publicly 
financed, exclusively black enclaves by private choice, we reject that request. The 
State provides these facilities for all its citizens and it has not met its burden under 
Brown to take affirmative steps to dismantle its prior de jure system when it 
perpetuates a separate, but >more equal= one.297 
 
Justice White=s admonition might sound like the death knell for historically black colleges, but his 
words must be understood in context.  Whether all universities within a system of higher education can 
continue to exist requires a careful evaluation of the general principle of Fordice. Within the Fordice 
analysis, it must be considered whether the racial identifiability of universities within a system, is a 
vestige of the prior de jure system, thereby channeling student choice and continuing the prior de jure 
effect.  If so, there must be a determination as to whether the continued existence of all universities 
within the system is educationally justifiable.  Closure or merger of any given institution is not a 
required Fordice remedy if its continued existence is educationally justifiable.   
Politically and fiscally, however, historically black colleges and universities are particularly 
vulnerable under the Aeducationally justifiable@ portion of the Fordice analysis.  Years of inequitable 
state funding for hiring faculty, capital improvements, and competitive programmatic offerings 
hampered the educational competitiveness of historically black colleges.298 Inadequate funding also 
 
297 United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 743 (1992) (emphasis added). 
298 Responding to the Needs of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Before the H. Subcomm. on 21st Century 
Competitiveness and the H. Subcomm. on Select Educ. Of the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Congress 7B8
(2002) (opening statement of Rep. Robert Scott); Responding to the Needs of Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities, Before the H. Subcomm. on 21st Century Competitiveness and the H. Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the 
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Congress 37B39 (2002) (statement of Michael Lomax) (discussing capital 
improvement and funding problems of HBCUs); LORENZO MORRIS, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE STATUS OF BLACK 
AMERICANS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 193B98 (1979).
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had an effect on student teacher ratio in the classroom, as well as the ability of the institutions to 
effectively recruit the best students.299 With these factors in mind, a sound, fair and equitable 
desegregation plan should not expect historically black institutions to bear the full brunt of 
desegregation remedial orders through their merger and closure.300  Neither the Louisiana, nor the 
Mississippi Settlement Agreement  resulted in the closure of any historically black institution.301 
Whether the plans have resulted in Ablack enclaves by private choice@ or institutions which are now 
"just universities," taking their place in an array of educational opportunities provided by the state has 
been, requires a critique.  Some theorize that the very existence of the historically black college is 
antithetical to the existence of a unitary system of higher education.302 If Brown said that Aseparate is 
 
299 See FRANK BOWLES & FRANK A. DECOSTA, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: A PROFILE OF NEGRO HIGHER EDUCATION 235 
(1971) (noting poor conditions in black colleges and universities with respect to education); see generally Responding to 
the Needs of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Before the H. Subcomm. on 21st Century Competitiveness and 
the H. Subcomm. on Select Educ. Of the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Congress (2002); see also Michael 
Nettles et. al, Student Retention and Progression: A Special Challenge for Private Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities, in PROMISING PRACTICES IN RECRUITMENT, REMEDIATION, AND RETENTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION 52 (Gerald H. Gaither ed., 1999).
 
300 In Fordice, Justice Thomas speaks to the educational value of the historically black college in a concurring opinion: 
[Historically black colleges] have succeeded in part because of their distinctive histories and 
traditions; for many, historically black colleges have become a Asymbol of the highest attainments of 
black culture.@. . . Obviously, a State cannot maintain such traditions by closing particular 
institutions, historically white or historically black, to particular racial groups. Nonetheless, it hardly 
follows that a State cannot operate a diverse assortment of institutions--including historically black 
institutionsBopen to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs that 
might disproportionately appeal to one race or another. No one, I imagine would argue that such 
institutional diversity is without Asound educational justification,@ or that it is even remotely akin to 
program duplication, which is designed to separate the races for the sake of separating the races.  
Id. at 748B49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
 
301 See generally Louisiana Settlement Agreement; Final Judgment, Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D (Feb. 15, 
2002). 
302See Diversity: The Emerging Modern Separate But Equal Doctrine wherein Professor Robert Davis characterizes 
Fordice as A[holding] open the separate but equal door....to provide educational justifications for maintaining 
[racially identifiable] institutions for the sake of diversity.   Id at 1 Wm. & Mary J. Women & Law 11, 51-52 (1994). 
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inherently unequal,@ the logic follows  that a Plessy created historically black school would be an 
unconstitutional entity.  To the contrary, the existence of historically black universities within a system 
of higher education is no more unconstitutional than is the existence of historically white universities.  
Rather, the question is whether the state=s current policies are deeply Arooted in prior officially 
segregated system[s] that serve to maintain the racial identifiability of its universities [and whether 
those policies] can practicably be eliminated without eroding sound educational policies.@303 
A proper focus on the Fordice construct suggests that those drafting the Louisiana and 
Mississippi plans should have been extremely hesitant to consider merger or closure as a viable remedy 
for resolving lingering effects of prior discrimination.  A truly progressive and effective desegregation 
plan in both states should have accounted for the successes the institutions experienced despite the 
disparities in funding they lacked.  The settlement processes in both states reflect these consideration.  
Both plans respected and valued the contribution of their respective historically black institutions by  
defining  their missions within the confines of Fordice, thereby exposing their educational 
justifiability. 304 Once the de jure segregative missions of the institutions were properly de-
 
But see, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does ASound Educational Policy@ Support the Continued 
Existence of Historically Black Colleges? wherein Professor Wendy Scott Brown challenges the notion that 
historically black colleges can not survive after Fordice. Professor Scott Brown suggests that a proper 
conceptualization of the Brown mandate of equal educational opportunity, as interpreted by Fordice, Are-centers the 
discussion on@the needs of African-American students and the Black community, [thus harmonizing]@ the tension 
between Athe development of sound educational policies and the achievement of equal educational opportunity.@ Id at 
43 Emory L. J. 1, 17-18 (1994). 
 
303 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743.
 
304 Comprehensive desegregation plans must Atransform institutions through new mission statements, creative program 
assignments, and enhanced institutional cooperation . . . .@ S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 222, at xvii. Justice White further 
commented in Fordice:
That an institution is predominantly white or black does not in itself make out a constitutional 
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constructed, all of the retained institutions and programs necessarily required enhancement.  At this 
juncture, the two states= historically black colleges could join as full partners in joint and cooperative 
relationships with other universities within the states= respective higher education systems.  Hence, 
their educational justification was  realized and fulfilled.305 
The Louisiana Agreement is very interesting respecting the question of the incorporation of the 
historically black college in a diverse assortment of institutions within the state=s system of higher 
education versus the problem of merger or closure of institutions.  Under the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement, the court retained jurisdiction in order to enforce the terms of the agreement.306 The court 
was not authorized to order Aany remedial action different from that set forth in the Settlement 
Agreement.@307 A careful analysis of the Settlement Agreement, however, reveals a requirement that 
the Fordice formulary was to be applied to the program duplication factor.308 Therefore, if the system 
 
violation. But surely the State may not leave in place policies rooted in its prior officially segregated 
system that serve to maintain the racial identifiability of its universities if those policies can 
practicably be eliminated without eroding sound educational policies. 
United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 743 (1992).
 
305 S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 222, at xvii (suggesting advancements in black institutions to enhance education levels).
 
306 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 30B31.
 
307 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 31. The Settlement Agreement operates as does any other settlement agreement 
in that there is not admission of liability on the part of the defendant and the defendant retains the entitlement to due 
process respecting the issues of liability and remedy before terms outside the text of the agreement can be imposed.
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is found out of compliance with the Fordice standard respecting program duplication, the court has to 
the power, to design its own remedy for compliance. Until the district court releases the system from 
oversight, a merger remedy like the one previously proposed but rejected by Judge Schwartz, is still 
available to the court,  irrespective of the terms of the Agreement. 
In crafting the 1989 Master Plan for desegregation in Louisiana, the Special Master focused on 
program duplication in evaluating the  presence of two state supported law schools in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana as a target for remedial action.  This was three years ahead of the Supreme Court=s
identification of the factor as relevant in Fordice.309 The Special Master identified the duplicate 
programs as a vestige of the prior de jure system and the remedy selected  and ultimately adopted by 




309  United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 513-514  (E. D. La. 1989). The Special Masters Report stated:   
 In cataloguing the problems associated with unwarranted duplication of programs, legal education in Louisiana 
looms large. There are two state supported law schools in Louisiana, Southern Law Center and the LSU Paul 
Hebert Law, both located in Baton Rouge. In terms of racial identifiability and academic achievement, they 
present remarkably different pictures. Southern Law Center is desegregated, with a student body 58 percent black 
and 42 percent white and a faculty, which is virtually 50/50. LSU Law Center on the other hand has a minuscule 
percentage of black students during the period of the Settlement Agreement, it ranged from 1.9% to 0.8%. In 
1988, it was only three percent. Moreover, the Louisiana bar passage rate at LSU Law Center has averaged about 
90% over the last five years, whereas at Southern Law Center it is under 50 percent . LSU Law School is a more 
successful law school from that perspective, but Louisiana blacks are largely educated at the inferior school. Yet, 
competitive, quality legal education for black is particularly important because the ratio because the ratio of 
black lawyers to the black population is very low, and law degrees are often recognized as an access point to 
political and economic power. Id. at 513 ( emphasis added) 
The report suggested an affirmative action program of a Aten percent category of admissions exceptions@ in order to 
Aincrease the diversity of LSU Law School,@ as well as scholarships for black students and serious recruitment efforts. Id. 
at 513B14.  See also, Susan Finch, Desegregation Saga Spans Four Decades, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, December 24, 
1992, at A1. (chronicling the decades old Louisiana higher  education desegregation case).  The trial court appointed  Paul 
Verkuil, then President of the College of William and Mary, and former Dean of the Law School at Tulane University Law 
School, as Special Master in the Louisiana case. Id.  
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Law Center as the surviving institution.310 This proposal of merger is an example of a common 
perception of the effects of desegregation remedies stemming  from the elementary and secondary 
cases, as well as the higher education context.  The criticism is a simple one evolving from 
desegregation efforts during the early years of Brown implementation which recognizes that the Acosts 
and burdens of desegregation [were] often disproportionately borne by African-American 
communities.@311 In this light, the loss of a professional school as a result of the Southern/LSU 
merger, would be an even greater reminder the early post-Brown years.312 This merger remedy became 
the lightening rod for a very contentious debate between the parties because the African American 
legal community was vehemently opposed to it.313 Fortunately, after hearing further evidence in the 
 
310 Id. at 514. The Special Master reported:  A[A]s long as the two institutions of disparate quality exist, the State will 
continue to produce a secondary class or lawyers unable to compete fully in the professional context.... [O]ver the nest 
five years, the Board must develop a plan of merger of the two schools.@ See id. at 514. (emphasis added)  The court=s final 
order required the merger of  ASouthern Law Center into the LSU Law Center.@ Id. (emphasis added)
 
311 Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Becoming Black in America, 67 MISS. L.J. 427, 458 n.133 (1997). 
312 The immediate post-Brown period witnessed the reassignment or dismissal of scores of black educators. In 1955 it was 
reported that Aas many as 6,000 black teachers and principals were dismissed from public schools in southern states. See 
id.
 
313 When the merger of the two law schools was originally announce as a remedy, the Louis A. Martinette Legal Society 
wrote to the district court  incensed with the court=s characterization of Southern University Law Center as Aan inferior 
school that produces a secondary class of lawyers....@ See John LaPlante, Black Lawyers Liken Judges=Reasoning on Law 
School Merger to That of Bigots, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., July 27, 1989, at 1B; see John LaPlante, Judges Get First 
Formal Bids to Halt Colleges Merger, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug., 1, 1989 at 1A; Court Nixes SU Appeal on 1 Board,
BATON ROUGE ST. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1989, at 1A. But see Lisa Frazier, La. Rights Group Calls For Universities= Merger, 
NEW ORLEANS, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 22, 1992, at B4; Scott Dyer, Judge Appears To Be Retreating From Merger,
BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Nov. 6, 1992, at 1-2B; Joe Gyan, Jr. Caucus Opposes Closing Historically Black Colleges, 
BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Dec. 5, 1992, at 9D, 9S.
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matter, the trial court reversed itself on the merger order.314 Nevertheless, within the confines of the 
implementation of the Settlement Agreement, it has become incumbent on Southern University Law 
Center to pay particular attention to this Fordice factor, because it is largely perceived as the Aduplicate 
school.@
Like other historically black institutions, Southern University Law Center=s casting as the 
Ainferior school... produc[ing second class lawyers]@ by the Special Master and its historical inferior 
treatment by its creator, continue as a background premise, producing calls for  justification by the 
school=s detractors and defensive-minded suspicion by its supporters.315 Although the Fordice question 
considers the entire higher education system, popular perception suggests that the subordinated entity, 
in this case Southern University Law Center, would be the most vulnerable of the two geographically 
proximate state law schools, so educational justifiability has become the linchpin of its remedial focus. 
 The Settlement Agreement required Southern University Law Center to Aprovide additional 
opportunities to enhance the skills of at risk students and to provide opportunities for law school 
attendance presently not available in the Baton Rouge area.@316 The state promised to Aimprove the 
 
314United States v. Louisiana, 811 F. Supp.1151, 1160 (E. D. La. 1993).  The district court reversed the merger 
order after receiving evidence that Southern University was one of the most desegregated institutions in the state=s
higher education system: A[T]he evidence submitted to the Court demonstrated that: (1) the school is fully integrated 
with a current student racial composition of 53% blacks and 47% whites; (2) the student/faculty ration, 17:1, is 
within acceptable limits; (3) there has been a marked improvement in the bar passage rate among Southern law 
students; (4) the library facilities are in compliance with ABA standards: and (5) the physical facilities are 
undergoing extensive renovation.@ Id at 1160, FN 54.  
315See supra note 309-310;  see also Section VII, infra. 
 
316 See id. at 20. The plan also incorporated the April 1994 Master Plan for Higher Education, Board of Regents, State of 
Louisiana; see also id. at Appendix E. Respecting program duplication and program differentiation, The Settlement 
Agreement required Southern University Law Center to institute a four-year part-time Juris Doctorate Program in the Fall 
of 1993, as well as a four-year part-time Juris Doctorate Program in the Fall of 1993. The establishment of this  program 
not only manages the Fordice factor of program duplication, it also differentiates Southern University Law Center=s
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quality of [its] physical facilities and academic offerings, articulate fundamental differences in the 
mission of the [two law schools],  [and] increase access to LSU Law Center.@317 With respect to the 
other historically black institutions within the Louisiana higher education system, the plan addressed 
the program duplication of proximate institutions by redefining their missions and by implementation 
of the four-step plan contained in Board of Regents 1993 Master Plan.318 
 
mission from that of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University. See generally id. at Appendix E, 
11B15, as excerpted from The Master Plan for Higher Education, Board of Regents, State of Louisiana, April, 1994. The 
implementation history of the Settlement Agreement over the last nine years suggests that Southern University Law Center 
will have met its responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement at the running of the term of the Settlement Agreement. 
In 1996, the Monitoring Committee commended the Law Centers progress in removing its probationary accreditation 
status with the American Bar Association. See Second Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, 
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 27B29 (May 1997). 
Each report of the Monitoring Committee ends with the committee=s Conclusions and Recommendations.  The Monitoring 
Committee has made no comments in its Conclusions and Recommendations on Southern University Law Center=s
progress under the Settlement Agreement since 1996.  The text of the 1996-1997  Monitoring Committee=s report 
acknowledges the Law Center=s progress respecting faculty salaries and faculty hiring, bar examination preparation, 
curriculum expansion, capital outlay improvements, and academic assistance for at risk students; Second Annual 
Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. 
Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 24B26 (May 1997). Southern University Law Center has differentiated its program offering 
from LSU Law Center through the institution of a part-time day program in 2000 and a part-time evening program in 2004, 
 thus creating the only state-supported part-time law school offering.   Interview with Elaine Simmons, Registrar, Southern 
University Law Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Jan. 22,  2007);  See also Catalog, Southern University Law Center,  
2006-08  at 40.    
 
317 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at Appendix H, 1, ' 12.
 
318 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 17-18. Under the plan, the state aspired to move Southern University, Baton 
Rouge from a Four-Year III University to a Four-Year II University.  Id at 4. This goal  required Southern University to 
end its open admissions policy in the year 2000. Beginning in the 2001 academic year, Southern University A & M 
implemented selective admissions requirements for freshman students. The Southern University campus at 
Shreveport/Bossier City is a Two-year I College and it was allowed to maintain its open admissions status under the 
Settlement Agreement. Id. at 6. By contrast, Louisiana State University maintained its status as a Four-Year I institution as 
the state=s flagship university. Id. at 3B4.  Under the Agreement, Grambling State University was a Four-Year IV 
University and it was allowed to maintain its open-admissions status under the Settlement Agreement. Id at 6; see also 
Ninth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United 
States v. Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 5 (May 2004). Southern University, New Orleans is a Four-V University and it was 
allowed to maintain its open-admissions status under the Settlement Agreement. See Louisiana Settlement Agreement at 5. 
 But see BD. OF REGENTS STATE OF LA., MASTER PLAN FOR PUBLIC POST-SECONDARY EDUC.: 2001, supra note 242, 
respecting Louisiana Board of Regents Master Plan modification of open admissions status of Grambling State University 
and Southern University New Orleans. Id. There are six categories of Southern Regional Education Board classifications 
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F.  Financial Support for Implementation 
The settlement process in Ayers was contentious and resulted in no unanimous viewpoint 
respecting its funding provisions.319 The Agreement was one large funding package binding the State 
of Mississippi to the terms of the Agreement for another seventeen years.  Criticisms were numerous: 
the Agreement was too expensive;320 the funding requirements would restrict state policymakers=
for four year universities and colleges and they are very important within the state=s assignment of a university=s mission 
status. S. REGIONAL EDUC. BD., EDUC. DATA, INST. CATEGORIES,
http://www.sreb.org/main/EdData/InstCategories/definitions.asp.  The Four-Year 1 category is the highest ranking, 
describing universities Aawarding at least 100 doctoral degrees that are distributed among at least 10 CIP categories with 
no more than 50 percent in any one category. Id. By contrast, a Four-Year II university is the second highest ranking, 
describing universities awarding at least 30 doctoral degrees that are distributed among at least 5 CIP categories.@ Id.  A 
Four-Year III university is the third highest ranking, describing universities Aawarding at least 100 master=s education 
specialist, post-master=s, or doctoral degrees with master=s education specialist, and post-master=s degrees distributed 
among at least 10 CIP categories.  Id. A Four-Year-IV university is the fourth ranking category, describing universities 
Aawarding at least 30 master=s education specialist, post-master=s, or doctoral degrees with master=s education specialist, 
and post-master=s degrees distributed among at least 5 CIP categories.  Id. The Four-Year V university is the fifth ranking 
category describing universities Aawarding at least 30 master=s education specialist, post-master=s or doctoral degrees.@ Id. 
The Four-Year VI university is the sixth ranking category describing universities Aawarding less than 30 master=s
education specialist, post master=s or doctoral degrees. Id. The CIP (Classification of Instruction Programs) is the 
organizational classification system used by the National Center for Educational Statistics in collecting, organizing and 
reporting survey data. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Classification of Instructional 
Programs: 2000, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/cip2000 (last visited January 25, 2007).  
 
319Judge Biggers= opinion reflected the general contentiousness of the Agreement: AUniversity professors and 
administrators have testified in favor of the Proposal.  University professors and administrators have testified against 
the Proposal.  Members of the Mississippi Legislature have testified in favor of the Proposal.  Members of the 
Mississippi Legislature have testified in opposition to the Proposal.  Education experts from outside the State, with 
no vested interest in any of the universities in this State, have testified in favor of and in opposition to the Proposal.  
Ordinary citizens of the State who hold no elected or appointed offices and who are not in the field of education, but 
who are not in the field of education, but who are interested as citizens and taxpayers, have expressed strong views 
on the issue.@ Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002 WL 91895, *3(N. D. Miss. 2002). 
 
320 Under a prior remedial plan designed by the court, requirements for enhancements at Jackson State University, Alcorn 
State University and Mississippi Valley State University were completed or substantially completed, yet the funding 
required by the Settlement Agreement in Ayers mandated additional millions of dollars. See Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002 WL 
91895, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 2002).
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future choices respecting structural changes to the state=s higher education system;321 the funding 
decisions within the plan were the result of a politicization of the litigation process, rather than the 
result of sound educational planning;322 expansion of the budgets for the historically black colleges 
supported program duplication in derogation of the law of Fordice;323 and finally, the state=s fiscal 
situation in the future might result in an inability to comply with funding mandates under the plan.324 
The Agreement was appealed by some of the private plaintiffs, alleging that the state of Mississippi 
had not complied with Title VI in its attempts to dismantle its prior de jure system of higher 
education.325 The appellants= primary criticism of the Settlement Agreement was its insufficient 
financial support for historically black colleges.326 Additionally, appellants were critical of the 
requirement that a numerical goal of 10% other race student enrollment must have been achieved and 
 
321 For example, should the state of Mississippi decide that it would want to close or merge institutions based on current 
fiscal necessity, the Settlement Agreement in Ayers v. Musgrove would prevent it from doing so until a passage of 
seventeen years from the implementation of the Agreement. See id. at *4.
 
322 See id. at *4. 
 
323 See id. at *4 n.7.
 
324 See Ayers, 2002 WL 91895, at *4. 
 
325 See Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 
326 See id. at 370.  
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maintained by the historically black colleges before the institutions could receive control of the public 
endowment.327 The Fifth Circuit subsequently determined that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in approving the Settlement Agreement .328 
Again, the entire focus of the Mississippi Settlement Agreement was the enhancement of 
historically black colleges in Mississippi in order to the create incentives for a greater presence of other 
race students. The Ayers Endowment Trust was created for this express purpose.329 Pursuant to the 
agreement,  if any historically black college or university Aattain[ed] a total head count other-race 
enrollment of 10% and sustain[ed] such a 10% other-race enrollment for a period of three consecutive 
years,@ that college or university would assume control of its pro-rata share of the endowment 
principal.330 The Agreement provided for spending for the improvement of academic programs,331 
327 See id. at 370.
 
328 Id. at 376.
 
329 The Ayers Endowment Trust was created under the settlement and it provides for $70 million in publicly funded 
money to be created over a 14-year period. The income from the public endowment  is to be spent by Alcorn State 
University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University for Aother-race marketing and 
recruitment, including employment of other-race recruiting personnel and award of other-race student scholarships.@
Id. at 9B10. The  Agreement ordered the creation of a $35 million  privately funded endowment to be used  by Alcorn 
State University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University for the same purposes as the public 
endowment. Id. at 11.  A committee staffed by the Presidents of the three historically black colleges, Commissioner of 
Higher Education, two Board of Trustee Members and an additional designated member manages the Endowment. 
The Board of Trustees maintains control of the Endowment until other-race enrollment goals are met by the 
historically black colleges. Id. at 9B10, 11B12. If the targeted enrollment figures are not reached by the 2018, a yearly 
evaluation reflecting the Agood faith efforts@ to reach the target will allow the colleges to receive the endowment 
income. Id. at 11B12.
 
330 Once the historically black college attains control over the endowment principal, it attains the discretion to invest the 
principal and spend the income for Asound academic purposes such as faculty compensation, academic program 
enhancements and student scholarships.@ See id. at 10. Nowhere in the Settlement Agreement, however, do the parties 
indicate how they arrived at a ten-percent other-race enrollment level as a benchmark for historically black colleges to 
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special summer academic programs,332 capital improvement funding,333 special Ayers Funding from 
the state legislature spanning a seventeen-year-period,334 and an elevation in status for Jackson State 
University.335 
reach in order to gain control over the principal of the Ayers Public and Private Endowments. In the 1970s, the Office of 
Civil Rights believed that it was important that a state-wide desegregation plan have as one of its goals, an  increase in the 
number of white students attending historically black colleges. See Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of 
Acceptable Plans To Desegregate State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 32, 6656B64 (Feb.15, 1978). 
The parties to the Mississippi Settlement Agreement could have used the comparable numbers of African American 
students on historically white campuses as a benchmark for the number of white students to set as a target goal on 
historically black campuses. The relative percentages across the last several years vary from single digit lows at 
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IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Miss.s Pub. Univs., Ayers Accountability Manual, ' iv, 
Sept. 15, 2005. Comparatively, white enrollment at the historically black colleges during the same period did not approach 
the same percentages. Id. 10% was more than the total number of African Americans enrolled in college in America in 
1980 and less than in 2000, 9% in 1980 and 11% in 2000. NAT=L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP=T. OF 
EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUC. OF BLACKS 92 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003034.pdf.
 
331 The state promised to spend $246 million dollars for new academic programs at Alcorn State University, Jackson State 
University and Mississippi Valley State University. These programs are mandated to comply with the Fordice requirement 
of sound educational justification and the desegregation goals Ayers v. Fordice.  Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 5B8
(Feb. 15, 2002).
 
332 This portion of the settlement provides $6.25 million dollars to be spent for qualifying students to attend summer 
78
The funding provisions in Louisiana Settlement Agreement were obligatory upon the state only 
for the duration of the Agreement.  With the expiration of the Settlement Agreement in 2005 came the 
expiration of all Agreement mandated funding of its special programs.336 The funding structure 
supported the programmatic enhancements for the historically black colleges, and it supported other 
race graduate scholarships at historically white colleges as well.337 All funding provisions in these 
categories which have not become self-sustaining are at risk for discontinuance.338 
developmental education classes. Id. at 4B5.
 
333 The state promised to spend $75 million dollars for new construction and physical renovations at Alcorn State 
University, Jackson State University and Mississippi State University. See Michael A. Fletcher, Mississippi Reaches $500 
Million Settlement in Desegregation Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2001, at A1.
 
334 ASpecial Ayers Funding@ is required for implementation of every facet of the agreement as well as the funding of the 
summer development programs, academic programs, public endowment and the capital improvements required under the 
Settlement Agreement. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 14B17.
 
335 The Settlement Agreement provided that Jackson State University be designated a Acomprehensive university.@ Id. at 
17B18.
 
336 See Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at I (Oct. 2005). 
337 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 13B14, 21B22. Under the Louisiana Agreement,  the state legislature 
committed $48 million dollars in spending for programs in the ten-year plan. The Southern University Board of 
Supervisors was allocated $34 million dollars for programmatic enhancement, development and implementation with an 
annual allowance of $4.1 million dollars. The University of Louisiana system was allocated $14 million dollars for 
programmatic enhancement, development, and implementation for Grambling State University. Id.
 
338 The Louisiana higher education system suffered significant budget cuts because of the significant economic downfall 
suffered by the state because of Hurricane Katrina. The full effect of these cuts and their effects on programs implemented 
under the Settlement Agreement is not yet know as of the submission of this article. See generally Id. at 13-17, 20B22, 
23B24, 27. Louisiana lawmakers approved a bill imposing large budget cuts on higher education. See Karin Fischer, 
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G. The Accountability Component As A Requirement of Measurable Outcomes 
The Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana completed its ten-year term under the 
supervision of a monitoring committee.339 The committee produced ten annual evaluations of the 
implementation of the Agreement.340 By comparison, no monitoring committee acts in an oversight 
capacity in the Mississippi Settlement Agreement.341 The parties to the Mississippi Agreement 
maintain contractual rights to seek specific performance of the contract pursuant to the terms, but there 
is no independent non-partisan monitor to evaluate progress under the agreement.342 The only 
semblance of an accountability measure is the annual disclosure provided by the Mississippi Board of 
Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning to the private plaintiffs  and counsel for the United 
States.343 The annual report is a factual disclosure detailing compliance with the critical portions of 
the Agreement.344 It is not evaluative, reflective or critical.  As of the completion of this article, only 
one report has been generated under the Mississippi Settlement Agreement.345 
Louisiana Legislature Imposes $77 Million In Cuts On State=s Colleges and Students, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., 
Nov. 23, 2005, available at http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/11/2005112301n.htm. In the Final Evaluation of the 
Desegregation Settlement Agreement the Monitors stated: AIf Louisiana can continue to fund its institutions of higher 
education adequately, and assuming that the equitable patterns of funding established during the period of the Settlement 
Agreement are sustained, students will get good educational opportunities where ever they go....But there is a wildcard, 
and its name was Katrina....In our judgment, these questions should not be addressed in evaluating the actions taken under 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.@ Final Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, 
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (Feb. 2006).  
339 See, e.g., Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at ii (Oct. 2005). 
340 Id. 
341 See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 29. 
342 See id. generally.
343See id. generally.
344Disclosure requirements mandated by the Agreement include disclosure of Aline items@ reflecting: A(I) Ayers bond 
revenues and settlement funds requested; (ii) Ayers bond revenues and settlement funds obtained; (iii) Ayers bond 
revenues and settlement funds expended; (iv) institutional enrollments by race at each public university; (v) by race and 
university, the number of participants in the summer program, the number of participants satisfactorily completing the 
program, and the number of successful participants enrolling in the following fall term; (vi) by race and university, the 
number of persons receiving funding pursuant to Section II of this Agreement, the total amount of funding received by 
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The 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement differed from its 1981 predecessor in that the 
former contained no benchmark numerical goals for proportional enrollment of other race enrollment 
in the historically black and the historically white institutions.346 Similarly, the 2001 Mississippi 
Agreement contained no numerical goals but focused on institutional enhancements and incentives for 
attracting other race students to historically black campuses.347 The attainment of specific enrollment 
numbers was eschewed in both Agreements because the parties saw them as  a hindrance to the 
successful implementation of a plan.  Since the standard for performance under both agreements 
hinges on a determination of substantial performance,  a challenge to a defendant=s performance is not 
 
each university and the standards used in distributing the funds; (vii) by university, the facilities projects receiving funding 
under section V of this Agreement, together with identification of those projects completed; (viii) by university, the 
academic programs receiving funding under section VI(b) of this Agreement; and (ix) the amount of private endowment 
raised and the amounts of public and private endowment income distributed to each university pursuant to section IV of 
this Agreement. Such annual disclosures will address the specified items regarding the immediately preceding fiscal year 
and will also include a cumulative summary of such items to date.@ Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 24. Judge 
Biggers= previous remedial  order of 1995 established a three-person committee charged with oversight of implementation. 
 He later  reduced the committee to a single monitor responsible  for supervising  implementation of the court=s order. See 
Ayers v. Musgrove, 358 F.3d 356, 361 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004); Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
345 See generally IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Miss. Pub. Univs., Ayers Accountability 
Manual, Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.ihl.state.ms.us/universities.html.
 
346 See 1981 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 15B16, Table 2  1991 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22 ("[e]ach 
state institution shall develop a comprehensive program for recruitment and retention of other race students"). The 1981 
Consent Decree, contained Equal Access provisions which set specific numerical goals: 1) Athe proportion of black high 
school graduates throughout the state who enter public institutions of higher education shall be equal to the proportion of 
white high school graduates throughout the State who enter such institutions,@ thus closing a 6.5% statewide differential. 
See 1981 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 3.   2) the Aproportion of qualified black Louisiana residents who graduate 
from undergraduate institutions in the state system and enter state graduate or professional schools shall be equal to the 
proportion of qualified white state residents who graduate from state institutions and enter state graduate an professional 
schools.@ Id. at 4;      3) Southern University in Baton Rouge and New Orleans as well as Grambling State University were 
to achieve a white student enrollment of 13.5% by 1987-1988; 4) Louisiana State University in Baton was to  achieve an 




definable with any numerical precision.   As long as no party to the agreement complains, the racial 
identifiability of many of the institutions in both states can remain with a wink and a nod of the parties. 
 In addition, litigation fatigue set in and the aggressive Department of Justice that instituted the Title 
VI enforcement against the states in the 1960s has been replaced by one that is motivated to clear these 
cases from the files.348 
A three person Monitoring Committee evaluated the progress and compliance of the state of 
Louisiana under its Settlement Agreement for ten successive years, producing a report for each year of 
implementation. The Committee=s tenth report confirms that many important Settlement Agreement 
initiatives were accomplished. New program implementation at historically black colleges has 
resulted in the award of 603 degrees during the ten-year period.349 Historically black colleges awarded 
more than $750,000 in other race scholarships.350 However, all historically black universities within 
the system reported very low numbers of other race students actually enrolled.351 Other race 
scholarships at historically white universities resulted in the award of 97 doctoral degrees during the 
term of the Settlement Agreement.352 Most capital outlay projects promised under the Agreement 
 
347 Mississippi Settlement Agreement (passim).
348See Halpern supra note 66. 
 
349 See Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation  on the Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at i. 
350 See id. (specifying scholarships were to SUBR and SUNO).
 
351 See id. at 16 (providing statistical chart of "other" race students from 1995 through 2004 attending Louisiana 
universities). 
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projects were completed.353 Program duplication review by the State Board of Regents was completed 
during the term of the Settlement Agreement, resulting in ninety programs in the system being merged, 
consolidated, or terminated.354 Program enhancements at the state=s historically black colleges, 
mandated under the Settlement Agreement, and were completed during the its term.355 As mandated 
by the Agreement, the Louisiana State Board of Regents completed a full evaluation of program 
duplication in 2001 as part of the plan to end open admissions in four year institutions.356 Open 
admissions for all four-year institutions will end in 2010 when Grambling State University and 
 
352 See id. at I
353 See id.
354 Second Annual Evaluation on the Louisiana Settlement Agreement at 19. Statewide, seventy-nine programs were 
terminated  and fifty programs were targeted for collaborative liaison between campuses. Id. The Settlement Agreement 
mandated the maintenance of current programs, and the development of new Ajoint, dual and collaborative@ programs 
between Louisiana State University and Southern University in Baton Rouge, New Orleans and Shreveport.  See Louisiana 
Settlement Agreement, at 16B17. These programs were successfully developed during the Settlement Agreement. Tenth 
Interim Annual Evaluation on the Louisiana Settlement Agreement at I; see also Second Annual Evaluation of the 
Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, 
No. 80-3300A, at 1, 27 (May 1997).
 
355 See Louisiana Settlement Agreement, 10B13 and Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement 
Agreement at I.. Only one program targeted for development was abandoned. Id.
 




Southern University in New Orleans, two historically black colleges, will be the last four-year 
institutions to institute selective admissions requirements.357 
Significant aspirational goals under the Louisiana Agreement, however, were not met. The 
state provided funds for historically black colleges in Baton Rouge and New Orleans to improve their 
Southern Regional Education Board classification during the ten-year term of the Agreement, however, 
this goal was not met.358 The Agreement provided funding incentives for other race student enrollment 
and other race employment rather than setting numeric goals in these areas.359 Unfortunately, across 
the ten-year period, the numbers in many institutions remained largely unchanged in entering freshman 
percentages in universities with selective admissions requirements. The employment statistics have 
 
357 After the Board of Regents four step review, the decision was made to eliminate all open admissions requirements in 
four year institutions. See id, supra, at 25B26, 42, 49.   Under the original terms of the Settlement Agreement, Grambling 
State University was allowed to retain  its open admissions policy. Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 6.   Generally, 
ending an open admissions requirement is intended to bolster graduation rates. The question left open by the end of open 
admissions in four-year colleges in Louisiana is whether this  will negatively impact African American student access to 
four year institutions.   Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, 
and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1783B84 (2004). See generally; Alfred Dennis Matthewson, Beyond 
Brown: Children, Race and Education Essay, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL=Y 299, 322 (2005).
 
358 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 3B5; Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, 
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, passim (Oct. 2005). 
Geographically proximate, historically white and historically black institutions maintained specific missions under the 
Louisiana Agreement. In order to eliminate current de jure effects of the prior de jure system, the historically black schools 
in two geographical proximate pairings (Southern University, Baton Rouge and LSU, Baton Rouge; Southern University, 
New Orleans, University of New Orleans), were provided the necessary financial support to move toward a higher SREB 
classification.  Supra note 318.   Neither university accomplished this goal within the ten-year period. Tenth Annual 
Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. 
State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 3 (Oct. 2005). In the Grambling State University, Louisiana Tech University 
geographic proximate pairing, Louisiana Tech was committed to changing its SREB status from SREB Four Year III to II 
status and it reached its goal.  Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 3B5;  Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation 
Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 
3 (Oct. 2005).
 
359 Tenth Interim  Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 16 (Oct. 2005); Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 20B22. 
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also remained relatively unchanged.360 Since the trial court will probably find that the universities 
have substantially performed the terms of the Agreement in these areas it is only speculative whether a 
more aggressive remedy would have been able to accomplish more towards accomplishing an 
integrative ideal. 
VI. Release from Federal Court Oversight: Availability of Grutter Affirmative Action in 
Louisiana and Mississippi 
The Settlement Agreement in the United States v. Louisiana was designed to remedy the 
vestiges of the state=s dual system of higher education by focusing specifically on its university=s
admissions standards, program duplication, and institutional mission assignments which were 
 
360 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 23B24. In the Tenth Interim Evaluation of the Monitoring Committee, the 
Committee commented that A[m]ovement toward increasing the diversity of employees continues to remain minimal.@
Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 16 (Oct. 2005); Louisiana Settlement Agreement, at 43. 
A comparison of employees demonstrates largely white employee staffs at historically white colleges and largely black 





Institution White Black Other White Black Other 
Grambling 74 966 54 83 648 44 
La. Tech. 895 203 25 927 212 58 
LSU A&M 4356 1149 321 4327 1225 467 
LSU-S 265 53 9 287 60 13 
UNO 972 288 127 1010 348 104 
ULL 1100 356 95 1154 407 103 
McNeese 579 132 1 576 150 31 
Southeastern 905 169 32 1097 185 53 
Nicholls 587 46 14 634 86 24 
Northwestern 564 94 21 698 103 31 
ULM 992 258 24 870 203 47 
Southern A&M 105 86 82 98 1472 71 
See Second Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at Appendix G, Number of Full Time Employees, Comparison 1995-
96 (May 1997); see also Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of 
the Settlement Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 43B44 (Oct. 2005). 
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responsible for continuing segregative effects.  The Settlement Agreement in Ayers v. Musgrove 
focused largely on incentives for the state=s historically black institutions to attract other race students 
across the next several years. The federal court in the Mississippi case has released the state of 
Mississippi from oversight and the parties in United States v. Louisiana look forward to a Declaration 
of Unitary Status, which will signify closure to the lawsuit and final assurance that there are no current 
effects of past de jure segregation causally linked to the prior de jure system. 
All of the targeted problems respecting differential admissions standards, program duplication 
and institutional missions assignments will have been resolved pursuant to the parties= understandings 
of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement and hopefully to the satisfaction of the trial court judge. At the 
point of the Declaration of Unitary Status, the federal court is no longer  empowered to issue any 
orders continuing remedial measures under the Agreement.361 For example, under the Louisiana 
Settlement Agreement, the federal court had the power to order race-specific or race-conscious 
remedial measures to provide other race scholarships and to hire other race staff, employees and 
faculty, and such measures would have been wholly appropriate. Unitary status, however, is 
antithetical to any arguments that there exist present effects of prior de jure discrimination.   Race qua 
race initiatives would most certainly be unconstitutional.362 The only constitutional use of race outside 
of a court-ordered desegregation agreement would be its use in Grutter affirmative action programs.363 
361 See Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at I, 47 (Oct. 2005). 
362See Regents v. Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). 
 
363 Grutter v. Bollinger,  539 U.S. 306, 328-340 (2003).  In Grutter, the Supreme Court found the University of Michigan 
Law School=s admissions program constitution.  Using race as a one of many factors, the plan was narrowly tailored 
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The United States Supreme Court has said that the attainment of Adiversity@ in a university 
student body is laudable, that it can serve as a compelling state interest should a university 
permissively employ diversity initiatives.364 The Louisiana monitors spoke to this issue in their final 
conclusions and recommendations: 
Diversity is important. We trust that all institutions adhere to the admissions criteria  
framework outlined in the Master Plan requiring that institutions have 15 percent of its 
entering class set aside for admissions exceptions in compliance with the Settlement 
Agreement and continue and to pay particular attention to the more aggressive 
recruitment efforts with respect to other-race faculty, staff, administration and 
students.365 
towards to accomplishment of the compelling state interest of diversity.  Id. 
364  Id. 
365 Tenth Interim Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 46 (Oct. 2005).
 
However, in the state of Louisiana, the maintenance of race-specific other race student, faculty and 
employee initiatives post-Declaration of Unitary Status also requires an analysis under Louisiana state 
constitutional law.  What may have been permissible under the Fordice-driven desegregation order, 
may be impermissible once the system has been declared unitary.  I predict that the next round of 
higher education litigation in the state of Louisiana will be those cases that seek to address a 
university=s attempt to implement Grutter diversity initiatives.  
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Under the Louisiana State Constitution of 1974, a Grutter affirmative action program that uses 
race as plus factor would raise serious state constitutional questions.  Article I, Section 3 of the 
Louisiana Constitution provides: 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate 
against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliation. No law shall 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of age, 
sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations.366 
This provision has been interpreted as exemplary of the concept that Aa state constitutional provision 
can . . . be intended to afford and construed as affording greater protection than its federal 
counterpart.@367 While the use of race as criteria in an affirmative action program must withstand an 
evaluation under strict scrutiny under the United States Constitution,368 Article I Section 3 of the 
Louisiana State Constitution provides that any use of race results in a complete repudiation of the 
law.369 If Louisiana Associated General Contractors v. State of Louisiana is authoritative in the 
context of higher education, for example, the Paul M. Hebert Law Center=s decision to seek the goal of 
diversity under the Grutter standard, using race as a plus factor, would result in a finding that the 
 
366 LA. CONST. art. I, ' 3 (emphasis added).
 
367 See La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, 669 So.2d 1185, 1196 (La. 1996). 
368 See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (providing Aall racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, 
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such 




program would be constitutionally invalid.370 If this analysis is correct, African-American enrollment 
at the flagship law school would be wholly dependent upon race-neutral criteria in the admissions 
selection now that the Settlement Agreement has expired.371 
The viability of Grutter diversity initiatives in the state of Mississippi, post Settlement 
Agreement is not so clear.  The state of Mississippi is one of thirty-five states of the union whose state 
constitutions do not contain an equal protection provision.372 However, the non-existence of an express 
equal protection constitutional text would not prevent a state from finding an implied understanding of 
equal protection within another constitutional text.   Thus, most states of the union have determined 
 
369 Associated General Contractors, 669 So.2d at 1196.
 
370 In La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the Louisiana 
Minority and Women=s Business Enterprise Act unconstitutional.  The Act contained a set-aside provision allowing a 10% 
set aside for minority business enterprises and 2% for women=s business enterprises with the concurrence of the 
Commissioner of Administration. LA. REV. STAT. ' 39:1955.  Additionally, the Act required each agency to submit 
strategic plans of compliance and if the agency failed to do so, the Division of Administration was empowered to 
formulate a strategic plan of compliance for the Agency.  LA. REV. STAT. ' 39: 1956 (A)(B). Holding the Act 
unconstitutional, Justice K. Kimball wrote: A[T]he act provides to members of certain designated races and excludes from 
members of non-designated races the opportunity to bid on certain contracts and the opportunity to match the lowest bid 
made by a non-minority bidder and thereby obtain the contract on certain other projects.  The set-asides and preferences 
under the Act clearly discriminate against a person on the basis of race, and the Act, to that extent, is unconstitutional 
under article I section 3 of the Louisiana State Constitution.@ Id. at 1200. 
371 Professor John Devlin of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University has critiqued  the state Supreme 
Court=s interpretation of the State Constitution=s equality provision:  
 
[I]n Louisiana . . . the prospect for robust independent state constitution based Avoice@ in civil rights is 
poor. There is little organic tradition of constitutional protection of civil rights in this state. . . . [T]he 
Louisiana Constitution as interpreted in [Louisiana Associated General Contractors], not only provides 
no truly independent contribution to debate over civil rights but also, I am sorry to say creates an 
additional obstacle to achievement of real world equality for traditionally disfavored groups. 
 
John Devlin, Louisiana Associated General Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee To 
Further the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L. REV. 887, 889 (2003).   
 
372 See MISS. CONST. art. 3, ' 5B32. The state constitutions of California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island and South Carolina contain equal 
protection provisions similar to that contained within the United States Constitution. The remaining states do not. See 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1055 n. 292 (2003).  
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that there exists some source of law within the state=s legislation or positive law, which creates a right 
to equal protection of the law.373 The state of Mississippi is one of two states where this determination 
has not been made.374 The Mississippi State Supreme Court has not interpreted the state of 
Mississippi=s due process provision as containing an equal protection component.375 Neither is there 
any decisional law which guides the resolution of the Grutter question upon the concomitance of 
release from federal court supervision and the expiration of the terms of the Ayers Settlement 
Agreement.  Only the passage of time can answer this question. 
VII. Epilogue: Justice Scalia=s Prediction in United States v. Fordice:  Racial 
Identifiability, the Integrative Ideal and the Limits of the Law 
 
If you build it . . .  they might not come!376 
 
373 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). Bolling was the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education 
wherein the Supreme Court  required the District of Columbia public schools to desegregate and established that the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution contained an Equal Protection component: 
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from `our American ideal of 
fairness, are not mutually exclusive.  The >equal protection of the laws= is a more explicit safeguard or 
prohibited unfairness than >due process of law,= and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always 
interchangeable phrases.  But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to 
be violative of due process. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
 
374 See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ.
239, 251 n. 57 (1999) (asserting ADelaware and Mississippi are the only two states whose courts have not held that 
their constitutions guarantee equal protection.@).
 
375 Id. 
376See infra note 399. 
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Justice Antonin Scalia was the lone dissenter in United States v. Fordice.377 His dissent has 
been largely ignored by scholars, possibly because the strength of the 8-1 opinion. Justice Clarence 
Thomas suggested that there could be no serious debate respecting the authoritativeness and 
appropriateness of the Court=s decision.378 It was Justice Scalia=s opinion that the Green standard, as 
applied by the majority, was inappropriate in the higher education context.379 According to Justice 
Scalia, AGreen has no proper application in the context of higher education, provides no genuine 
guidance to States and lower courts, and is as likely to subvert as to promote the interests of those 
citizens on whose behalf the present suit was brought.@380 Justice Scalia speculated that the majority=s
application of Green to the higher education context would result in: 
[Y]ears of litigation-driven confusion and destabilization in the university systems of 
all the formerly de jure States, that will benefit neither blacks nor whites, neither 
predominantly black institutions nor predominantly white ones.381 
377 See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J. Concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia agreed with the 
majority that states operating under a prior de jure system of segregation in higher education were constitutionally required 
to Aremove all discriminatory barriers to its state-funded universities.@ Id. He also agreed that the State of Mississippi was 
not constitutionally Acompel[led] to remedy  funding disparities between its historically black institutions (HBI=s) and 
historically white institutions (HWI=s).@ Id.
 
378 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating A[n]o one, I imagine, would argue that such institutional 
diversity is without "sound educational justification, or that it is even remotely akin to program duplication, which is 
designed to separate the races for the sake of separating the races.@
379 See id. at 748. 
380 Id. at 759.
 
381 Id. at 762.
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Indeed, Justice Scalia pondered whether the application of Green might, in fact, redound to the 
detriment of historically black colleges.382 His comment was both perceptive and insightful.   System-
wide dismantlement poses a very real threat for both historically black and white institutions.  While 
historically black institutions are thought to be the most vulnerable when program merger or closure is 
used to achieve Fordice dismantlement, the elimination of a geographically proximate historically 
white institution does not necessarily mean that a historically black institution will attract the former=s
student constituency.383 As between the choice of the Bazemore standard and the Green standard as 
announced in Fordice, Green would have been the only constitutional route through which a true 
integrationist ideal could be achieved.  However, neither whites, nor African Americans want 
integration, if integration means the loss of institutions either group reveres. If Justice Scalia=s words 
in Fordice were anything, they were a signal to those who represented the interests of historically black 
colleges in both Mississippi and Louisiana, that  Fordice as a tool in the hands of a federal court judge 
 
382 See id. at 760
 
383 See id. In the Tennessee desegregation case, the University of Tennessee campus located in Nashville, Tennessee was 
geographically proximate to the historically black Tennessee State University.  As part of the judicially designed  remedial 
plan for desegregation, the court ordered the Nashville campus of University of Tennessee merged into Tennessee State 
University.  White students who had previously attended University of Tennessee, Nashville, opted instead to drive many 
additional miles to attend Middle Tennessee State University. See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 652B53 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1977); Geier v. Univ. of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 881 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1989); see 
also Matt Pulle, White Out: The TSU Audits Didn=t Focus on Another Problem: The School=s Lack of White Kids,
NASHVILLE SCENE, May 6, 2006, available at http://www.nashvillescene.com, where the author notes that although TSU 
was growing, Awhite students flocked to MTSU.@; Liz Murray, Lightening Up, NASHVILLE SCENE, Nov. 10, 1997, 
available at http://www.nashvillescene.com, for a discussion on how TSU administration seem unable to stem the tide of 
Nashville students who now drive to Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro. 
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could be risky business for those who were proponents of those interests.384 The litigants in both 
cases sought to avoid the unpredictability a  judicially drawn remedy. 
In view of the Mississippi case, Justice Scalia may have been correct.  Once the case was 
remanded to the district court, another nine years passed before the parties reached a settlement.385 The 
Mississippi Settlement Agreement placed all responsibility for Fordice dismantlement upon the 
historically black colleges with monetary rewards for successful performance. The Louisiana case 
settled within a shorter period of time and created various enhancements at the historically black and 
historically white institutions to attract other race students. However, at the expiration of the 
Louisiana Agreement and approximately six years into the funding provisions of Mississippi 
agreement many of the states= universities are still substantially identifiable by race.386 Whether the 
 
384See Section V(E), infra. 
385 See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F.Supp 1419, 1428 (N.D. Miss. 1995), aff=d, 358 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Ayers v. 
Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 2004). 
386 Both Settlement Agreements focus on universities attracting other race students. See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, 




Institution White Black Other White Black Other 
La Tech 78.95% 12.51% 8.54% 68.0% 15.7% 16.2% 
LSU A&M 77.49% 8.34% 14.17% 80.9% 8.8% 10.2% 
LSU-S 80.51% 14.72% 4.77% 60.2% 30.9% 8.9% 
UNO 57.3% 27.2% 20.0% 51.0% 30.5% 18.5% 
ULL 72.73% 18.95% 8.32% 74.3% 19.1% 6.6% 
McNeese 81.57% 14.77% 3.66% 74.0% 21.4% 4.6% 
Southeastern 88.73% 8.24% 3.03% 75.0% 18.9% 6.1% 
Nicholls 81.29% 13.62% 5.09% 68.8% 24.7% 6.5% 
Northwestern 71.16% 20.39% 8.45% 51.4% 37.7% 10.9% 
ULM 73.59% 20.29% 6.12% 74.3% 19.1% 6.6% 
Southern A&M 4.32% 93.76% 1.92% .3% 96.5% 3.3% 
See Second Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at Appendix F (May 1997) (providing 1995 statistics); see also Tenth 
Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement United 
States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 14B16 (Oct. 2005). 
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erasure of segregative effects or racial non-identifiability in higher education under the Fordice 
formula was ever attainable is a real question and perhaps an unanswerable one considering all the 
variables.   The numbers are most disparate at the historically black colleges and universities.  White 
students still do not readily choose to attend historically black undergraduate universities in any 
 
See also IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Ayers Accountability Manual, ' iv, Sept. 15, 2005.  
Institution Ethnicity Fall 2002 Fall 2003 Fall 2004 
White 281 327 25 
Black 2,858 2,955 3,080 
Other 0 0 2
Alcorn State University 
Not Identified 0 0 0
White 2,473 2,445 2,333 
Black 1,353 1,401 1,601 
Other 36 56 47 
Delta State University 
Not Identified 0 0 0
White 306 342 291 
Black 7,296 7,310 7,756 
Other 53 54 72 
Jackson State University 
Not Identified 0 0 0
White 12,517 12,124 11,921 
Black 2,930 2,945 2,970 
Other 386 400 446 
Mississippi State 
University 
Not Identified 744 704 597 
White 104 96 103 
Black 3,030 3,353 3,415 
Other 4 8 11 
Mississippi Valley State 
University 
Not Identified 32 49 92 
White 10,656 11,298 11,737 
Black 1,685 1,822 1,917 University of Mississippi 
Other 255 319 364 
Not Identified 539 365 479 
White 1,327 1,416 1,575 
Black 180 196 266 
Other 166 161 162 
University of Mississippi 
Medical Center 
Not Identified 0 152 167 
White 10,901 10,765 10,586 
Black 3,502 3,581 3,887 
Other 555 552 613 
University of Southern 
Mississippi 
Not Identified 0 152 167 
Id. Note the effective date of the Mississippi Settlement Agreement was October 18, 2004 after the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. However, funding draws on the Settlement Agreement began from 2002. See id. 
generally.
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significant numbers when historically white alternatives are available.387 That many of these 
universities are still essentially racially identifiable suggests that there may be limits to what higher 
education desegregation law may achieve as a result of an agreement between the parties and perhaps 
even at the hand of a federal court judge. 
A study conducted in 2004 suggested several reasons why Mississippi=s historically black 
colleges and universities may not experience the significant integration or desegregation which was 
sought in its settlement agreement.388 The report was based on the responses of participants in several 
focus group studies from whom white student perceptions of historically black colleges and 
universities were drawn.389 The responses suggested that the populations surveyed generally perceived 
the historically black college or university negatively.  They voiced concerns about institutional 
quality,390 academic credibility,391 white minority status on historically black college campuses,392 
387The statistics are different at the only historically black professional school within either the Louisiana or 
Mississippi system, suggesting that when educational resources are scarce and therefore considered more valuable, 
white students will compete for limited places and choose to attend historically black institutions.   Southern 
University Law Center is one of the most desegregated institutions within either the Louisiana or Mississippi higher 
education systems.  The Law Center has graduated a total of 3056 students since it opened in 1947.  Interview with 
Elaine Simmons, Registrar, Southern University Law Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Jan. 22,  2007).  Of these 
graduates, 1999 have been African American and 1057 have been white.  Id. The first white law student graduated 
from the Law Center in May, 1972  Id. However, the total white student graduation statistic represents 34.5%of the 
Law Center=s graduating population and this has been attained  within the last 34 years of the Law Center=s
existence. Id. 
388 See Paul E. Sum, et al., Race, Reform, and Desegregation in Mississippi Higher Education: Historically Black 
Institutions after United States v. Fordice, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 403, 411B16 (2004) (discussing reasons such as 
perceived quality and academic credibility; social discomfort and minority status; reverse discrimination; and parent and 
peer pressure). 
389 See id. at 414. 




discriminatory treatment at the hands of African American students,393 and finally, parental or peer 
disapproval of the choice of an historically black college.394 The writers commented that the exclusive 
remedial focus on the historically black colleges might jeopardize the desegregation effort if these 
attitudes hold true across time.395 
The 2004 study also suggested the Fordice settlement might be premised upon the incorrect 
assumption that current African American student choice of historically black institutions is 
necessarily connected to the prior de jure segregation;396 that the responsibility for desegregation may 
be unfairly and disproportionately borne by the historically black colleges;397 and that resultant failure 
to achieve projected settlement other-race percentages may portend danger for Mississippi historically 
 
391 See id. at 417 (finding that Awhite high school and community college participants generally felt that quality of 
education was low at the HBIs@).
 
392 See id. at 419 (quoting focus group participant who described friend's experience of attending historically black 
institution, "[h]e said he was like the only white person there, and he felt so stupid").
 
393 See Id at 422B23 (describing general sentiment among focus group participants were that white students would not be 
welcomed by black students at historically black colleges).
 
394 See Id. at 424B25 (quoting focus group participant, "I don't have a problem with black people, but the people I'm 
around do").
 
395 See id. at 433. 
396 See id. at 429. 
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black colleges in the future.398 These observations may not only be germane to the future of black 
colleges in Mississippi.  The observations of the study may pose important questions about the future 
of the historically black college in general, but only if historically black institutions view themselves as 
passive actors, waiting for other race students to realize their presence, their value, and their 
importance as a one of many actors in their state=s diverse array of offerings of colleges and 
universities. 
If diversity in the student body is an important goal for the historically black college, then the 
observations of the study can  be the foundations of another conversation.  Perhaps the historically 
black college can take the last breath of Fordice as the moment within which it re-conceptualizes, 
redefines, and moves itself forward.  The Field of Dreams approach for diversity enhancing initiatives 
at historically black colleges under Fordice probably does not work and the experiences of the 
historically black colleges under both Agreements are probably evidence of this conclusion.399 In the 
21st century, where Fordice is ending, and Grutter diversity work should begin, the efforts of Alcorn 
State University under the Mississippi Settlement Agreement may demonstrate how the mandatory 
requirements under Fordice might inform promising future Grutter work. 
 
397. See id. at 430B431.
 
398 See Id. at 432B433. 
 
399 The 1989 movie, Field of Dreams opens with Ray Kinsella=s dream voice telling him that if he builds a baseball 
diamond in his cornfield, the Chicago Black Sox team will come and play for him. More specifically, the much maligned 
Shoeless Joe Jackson will come: AIf you build it . . . he will come.@ See Field of Dreams (Universal Pictures 1989).
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Alcorn State University is the only historically black university in the state of Mississippi  
which has successfully met the three year attainment of ten-percent other race student enrollment, 
thereby entitling it to receive its pro-rata share of the principal existing under the public endowment 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.400 It was able to accomplish this goal under the Settlement 
Agreement through aggressive marketing and recruitment.401 However, Alcorn State University did not 
conceive of its other race recruitment goal as narrowly as the parties to the agreement may have 
intended.  It did not target the same pool of students as had those who conducted the focus group and 
who seemed to be so negatively predisposed to the idea of attending an historically black college.402 Its 
other race students are not only whites from the state of Mississippi, they are whites who hailed from 
Australia, Canada, and Russia. As the university converts it Fordice work into a diversity project, it 
moves towards a future where its recruiters also plan to seek out more Hispanic students.403 Alcorn=s
400 See Mississippi Settlement Agreement, at 10.  
 
401 See Alcorn State's Benefits from Ayers Fund Begin: Alcorn State University, Dining Hall Construction, 22 DIVERSE 
ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. 20, 20, Dec. 15, 2005 (stating Alcorn State successfully reached its 10% other-race student goal); 
see also Historically Black Alcorn State Univ. Takes Pride in its Growing 'Minority' Enrollment, JOHNSON PUB. CO., at 
22, Apr. 28, 2003 (recruiting international students actively had strong positive effect on meeting desegregation goals). 
402 The Focus Group Study conducted in 2004 suggested as much, Ageneral belief was that few >traditional= students from 
the region would attend an HBI, especially if they had other options.@ See Sum, supra note 388, at 427.
 
403 See Kay Mills, A Mixed Blessing?: Critics Object to Mississippi=s Settlement of a 1975 Anti-Segregation Lawsuit 
Involving the State=s >Historically Black Universities, NAT'L CROSSTALK, Summer 2004, available at 
http://www.highereducation.org/crosstalk/ct0304/news0304-blessing.shtml; Sara Hebel,  Alcorn State  Meets Nonblack 
Enrollment Goal Under Desegregation Settlement, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Vol. 52, Issue 14, p. 
A33 , November 25, 2005, see also Alcorn State University Five-Year Strategic Plan FY 2007 Through 2011,  Submitted 
to: IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Submitted By: Dr. Clinton Bristow, Jr. President Alcorn 
State University, Alcorn State, Mississippi 39096-7500, August 1, 2006, at 4B5.
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creative approach to its desegregation work  reflects an ultimate truth in the words of the Louisiana 
Monitors as they closed the Tenth Interim Report to Judge Kurt Englehardt: 
[A] Desegregation Settlement Agreement is just another step in the long 
process of achieving a more just and equitable society. Its effects, and the very 
substantial financial commitments made by [a state] will prove beneficial only 
if the behavior that has been engendered during the [agreement] becomes the 
normative behavior for all those responsible for higher education in [the 
state].404 
404 Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement 
United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A, at 47 (Oct. 2005).
 
